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Abstract 
The Air Force Working Capital Fund (AFWCF), a revolving fund established to 
create a more business-like environment between the Air Force and its customers, is 
comprised of several divisions providing depot level repairs, supplies and inventory, 
information technology solutions and transportation services to military customers.  Since 
its establishment, the AFWCF has been the source of much criticism due to its inability to 
meet its primary goal of operating on a break-even basis.  Ideally, the Fund will generate 
enough revenue from the sale of goods or services to cover its expenses and break-even.  
Instead, there is either a surplus that must be reintroduced into the AFWCF or, as most 
often the case, a deficit occurs.  Due to regulatory requirements, the Fund must recoup 
these lost monies in a subsequent year.  This profoundly affects the ability to accurately 
build the budget and reach the break-even point.  This research analyzes the past 
performance of the AFWCF and identifies which areas are key drivers in preventing the 
AFWCF from meeting this goal.  Lastly, the pricing strategy of the Materiel Support 
Division was evaluated based on commercial best practices to determine if its pricing 
schema lends itself to meeting the goals of the AFWCF. 
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AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRICING STRATEGY EMPLOYED BY AN AIR 
FORCE WORKING CAPITAL FUND ORGANIZATION 
 
I.  Introduction 
Background 
 Since its inception, the Department of Defense (DOD) has struggled to keep costs 
under control and within budget constraints.   Throughout its existence, many attempts 
have been made to alter the DOD’s operating environment.  Most recently, Acquisition 
Reform and Earned Value Management have impacted Defense communities with 
positive results.  However, these most recent reform initiatives have failed to largely 
influence one area of the DOD in particular, the Defense Working Capital Fund (DWCF).   
 The DWCF is the direct result of the dissolution of the Defense Business 
Operations Fund (DBOF).  DBOF, a revolving fund account that sells unique goods and 
services, was established in 1991 by combining the nine industrial and stock funds that 
had been established as early as the mid-1800s.  The goals of DBOF were to fully recover 
costs (break-even over time), reduce inventory levels and support costs, consolidate 
similar operations, and provide visibility of total costs (FMRS, Chapter 80-6).   Prior to 
the realignment of these funds, each account was separately managed.  Subsequent to the 
stand-up of DBOF, the funds were centrally managed by the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (Comptroller).  Later, the “DOD devolved the responsibility for cash 
management to the military services and DOD Components” (GAO, 1997: 2) and created 
the Defense Working Capital Fund.  The premise behind this change was to create a more 
business-like environment and instill stronger buyer-seller relationships between its 
customers and Fund divisions.   Soon after the change to the DWCF, the Under Secretary 
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of Defense (Comptroller) formed the four initial working capital funds as we know them 
today: Army, Navy, Air Force and Defense-wide (the Defense Commissary Agency was 
added in 1999).  This further dissemination of responsibility provided a means of 
allowing each of the services management control of all financial and functional facets of 
their Funds.   
Army Working Capital Fund Air Force Working Capital Fund
Navy Working Capital Fund Defense-Wide Working Capital Fund
Defense Working Capital Fund
 
Figure 1.  DWCF Organization 
While all of DBOF’s goals are significant, it is the relationship between how the 
costs are fully recovered and how the DWCF sets its prices that is of interest in this study.  
Unfortunately, DBOF (now the DWCF) has failed to meet its goal of operating on a 
break-even basis.  In other words, it has not been able to fully recover the cost of its 
operations.  In fact, a 1997 GAO report, Defense Depot Maintenance, estimated that by 
the end of fiscal year 1997, the operating loss across all funds would reach $1.7 billion 
(GAO, 1997: 7).  Today, the Funds continue to lose money.  The problem lies in the fact 
that the rates the Funds must charge are set as early as two years in advance of the budget 
year and cannot be changed once included in the President’s Budget (PB).  This lead-time 
is necessary to provide customers the insight needed to plan and budget their resources.  
As one might expect, by the time the current year rolls around, actual prices can change 
dramatically, yet the customer is still charged the same rate established by the PB.  
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Additionally, any loss incurred in a previous year must be added to the rates of the 
subsequent year in an attempt to recoup those lost monies.  As one of the DWCFs, the 
Air Force Working Capital Fund has not been immune to these pricing deficiencies. 
The AFWCF itself is separated into four distinct funds: the Supply Maintenance 
Activity Group (SMAG), the Defense Maintenance Activity Group (DMAG), the 
Information Services Activity Group (ISAG), and the United States Transportations 
Command’s (USTRANSCOM) Transportation Working Capital Fund (TWCF) (Figure 
2).  The first three activity groups are the sole responsibility of the Air Force while the 
TWCF has been placed under the AFWCF for cash management purposes.  As previously 
mentioned, the Funds sell unique goods and services to their customers.  The SMAG 
procures and manages supply items such as spares, fuels and general consumables.  The 
DMAG provides major overhaul, modification and repair services for aircraft, missiles, 
engines and spare parts while the ISAG provides various information technology services 
such as software development and computer support.  Finally, the TWCF provides 
valuable transportation support for day-to-day operations, as well as contingency 
operations.  Since each of these divisions of the AFWCF have unique missions, it is 
expected that they would also have unique pricing strategies.   
Research Focus 
 It is the unique pricing strategies of the activity groups that are of interest to the 
researchers on this project.  The DOD Financial Management Regulation 7000.14R, 
Volume 2B, Chapter 9 states: 
“The (Defense Working Capital) Fund includes a variety of activity groups that are     
categorized in two groups for rate setting purposes. 
1. Supply Management Activity groups.  Utilize commodity costs in conjunction with a 
surcharge to establish customer rates. 
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2. Non-Supply Management Activity groups: Depot Maintenance, Research and 
Development, Transportation, Distribution Depots, Base Support, and all other activity 
groups have unit cost rates established based on identified output measures or 
representative outputs.  These output measures establish fully cost burdened rates per 
output, such as a cost per direct labor hour, cost per product, cost per item received, cost 
per item shipped, etc.  The activity groups establish both their output rates and the 
stabilized customer rates through the same general process.”  
 
Material Support Division
MSD
General Support Division
GSD
Supply Management Activity Group
SMAG
Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center
OC-ALC
Ogden Air Logistics Center
OO-ALC
Warner-Robins Air Logistics Center
WR-ALC
Organic Depots
Contractor Depots
Depot Maintenance Activity Group
DMAG
Material Support Group
MSG
Systems Support Group
SSG
Information Services Activity Group
ISAG
Transportation Working Capital Fund
TWCF
Air Force Working Capital Fund
AFWCF
 
Figure 2.  Air Force Working Capital Fund Organization 
Based on the definitions above, the SMAG sets it rates based on the costs of its 
goods plus a surcharge added across all product lines.  On the other hand, the 
DMAG and ISAG fall under the Non-Supply Activity Groups when setting their 
rates and prices.  Each uses an output measure to set its rates for services 
provided.  DMAG recovers cost of operations by charging customers a standard 
rate per hour dependent upon which type of aircraft, missile, engine, etc. it 
repairs; this is called the Direct Per Standard Hour (DPSH).  ISAG recovers its 
costs by charging an all-inclusive rate per Direct Labor Hour (DLH); in this case 
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customers are charged the same rate per hour no matter what type of service they 
are receiving.  
The particular focus of this study is two-fold.  First, an analysis of the 
AFWCF’s performance will be conducted to determine how well the activity 
groups are performing.  The second concentration of this study is to determine if 
the pricing strategy employed by the Materiel Support Division (MSD) of the 
Supply Management Activity Group (SMAG) of the AFWCF preclude the DWCF 
from meeting its goal of fully recovering all costs.  In order to determine where 
the division needs to make changes or improvements, the theory behind different 
pricing strategies must be studied.  These different theories will aid in identifying 
a causal relationship between the price setting strategies employed and the regular 
loss of revenue or customer demand, and determine why the Fund fails to break-
even.   
Additionally, a recent study conducted by the RAND Corporation looked at the 
pricing strategy of another DWCF organization, the Defense Finance and Accounting 
Service (DFAS).  DFAS provides assorted finance and accounting services to several 
DOD components.  Its current pricing strategy utilizes expected average costs to set rates.  
The study found that a non-linear pricing strategy might be more appropriate than its 
current pricing strategy based on the expected average costs of services provided.  This 
non-linear pricing schema allows DFAS to receive fixed annual payments from 
customers at high levels while receiving per-unit payments throughout the year.  
Additionally, they hypothesize that this type of pricing strategy may be suitable for other 
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DWCF organizations (Gates, 2002).  This study will determine if non-linear pricing is 
appropriate for the MSD as well. 
Research Questions  
The intention of this research is to evaluate factors relevant to the pricing of 
the AFWCF goods and services.  The following research questions were 
presented: 
1. Are the goals of the DWCF reflected in the AFWCF Activity 
Group’s pricing strategies? 
2. How do the different Activity Groups under the AFWCF differ in 
their pricing strategies?  Is any Activity Group’s pricing strategy 
allowing them to break-even? 
3. How can the current pricing strategies be improved upon to come 
nearer to meeting the DWCF’s goals?  Where should the Air Force 
focus its efforts to improve the MSD pricing strategy? 
Methodology 
The first portion of this research will be accomplished through a multiple-
case design study where each activity groups of the AFWCF is a different case.  
This study will be accomplished by obtaining financial data for fiscal years 1999-
2002 (The GAO reported that prior to 1999, accounting records are not complete 
enough to provide accurate data).  I will look at the historical performance of the 
AFWCF based on the Net Operating Result (NOR).  Then I’ll narrow the scope to 
identify how the individual activity groups are performing.  This will again be 
accomplished by analyzing the NORs along with revenue and expense categories.  
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That information, along with information obtained through interviews of key 
AFWCF personnel will assist in answering research questions one and two. 
Then again, the focus will be narrowed to concentrate on the MSD portion 
of the SMAG in a single-case design study.  This division was chosen due to its 
size and complexity; both of which will be explained in detail in chapter 2. We 
will study the pricing strategy of this division and its performance over the past 
few years.  Based on information found in Chapter 2, we will determine how well 
the division is performing and point out strengths and deficiencies of the current 
pricing strategy based on commercial best practices. 
Data necessary for this analysis will be obtained from budgeting and 
accounting records, Budget Estimate Submissions (BES), the Air Force Total 
Ownership Cost (AFTOC) system and through interviews with key Air Force 
Working Capital Fund personnel from the Assistant Secretary, Financial 
Management & Comptroller (SAF/FM), Washington, D.C., and Headquarters Air 
Force Materiel Command (HQ AFMC), Wright-Patterson AFB, OH. In addition, 
relevant information will be acquired from published regulations, policies, and 
procedures. 
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II.  Literature Review 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine and review literature applicable to 
revolving funds and how they work, why the Defense Working Capital Fund (DWCF) 
was formed, and current pricing strategies employed by the Air Force Working Capital 
Funds (AFWCF).  It will also include information on price setting that will aid in 
determining if the strategy employed by the MSD is appropriate.   
No different from civilian corporations, the Department of Defense (DoD) must 
accurately price its goods and services to avoid operating at a loss.  However, the DoD is 
in a unique situation that most civilian corporations are not; the DoD is not in the 
business to turn a profit but rather strives to break-even.   
Background  
 To gain an understanding of the how the AFWCF sets its rates and prices, it is 
first necessary to identify where the fund began and why it was established.  As early as 
the 1870s, the United States military procured materials from commercial vendors, held 
these items in inventory, and resold them to the military forces as needed, recovering 
only the cost of the item.  The monies incurred from these sales were used to restock 
inventories; thus the entire process repeated itself.  This stock fund, which essentially 
provides spare parts to its customers, (GAO, 2001) is known as a revolving fund due to 
the cyclical nature of the buying and selling of goods.  A revolving fund relies on the 
revenue it receives from goods or services sold to sustain its operations.  The military 
introduced additional revolving-type funds in the 1940s to provide “industrial and 
commercial-type services” to the operating forces such as depot maintenance activities.  
Similar to the stock fund, the industrial fund was replenished with revenue from the sale 
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of goods or services and more goods were purchased or more services provided.   
However, the industrial funds recouped the cost of materials along with any additional 
overhead costs (DWCF Handbook, Ch 2).   
DBOF.  The U.S. military operated under these funds until the early 1990s.  In 
October 1991, Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Atwood established the Defense 
Business Operations Fund (DBOF) (Jordan, 1995).  This newly formed fund combined 
the cash balances of the various industrial and stock funds into one centrally managed 
account controlled by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (GAO, 1997: 
6).  The purpose of establishing a centrally managed fund, as stated in the Defense 
Management Review Decision 971, was “to provide better tools and information for 
employees at every level of the support establishment, and to provide better information 
to decision makers at every level” (Jordan, 1995).  Furthermore, it was an effort to both 
transform the way the Defense Department controlled its resources and encourage a more 
business-like, buyer-seller relationship with its customers (GAO, 1997: 6).   
The underlying goal of DBOF was total cost visibility while stressing the cost 
consequences of decisions made by management (GAO, 1997: 9).  Prior to the standup of 
DBOF, there were few incentives for customers to control the goods or services due to 
the absence of any relationship with the seller.  The buyer ordered from the revolving 
funds to replenish their supply inventory.  However, all too often parts were ordered 
simply because they were essentially free to the customer.  Thus, many units were 
placing orders for goods or services not essential to their operations and getting them, in 
essence, for free.  This concept is analogous to that of a new car with an all-inclusive 
warranty.  While a vehicle is under warranty, the manufacturer is responsible for 
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repairing even the most minor problems at no charge to the customer.  As such, there are 
no incentives for the car owners to make repairs themselves or make trade-off decisions 
on what they need repaired.  Equally, revolving fund customers had no incentive to 
control what they purchased or when they purchased it. 
  DBOF, on the other hand, was intended to dissuade this type of behavior.  Under 
the DBOF premise, Congress approves an annual budget for the customers and 
distributes the appropriated funds.  The customer uses these funds (Operations and 
Maintenance money) for their day-to-day operations as well as any revolving fund goods 
or services they require.  With this limited budget, the customer must manage its funds 
closely and often make critical choices where it will be spent; often having to forego 
necessary orders due to lack of funds.  This can create a problem for the warfighter due to 
the fact that with the limited budget there is often a trade-off decision that must be made 
between ordering wartime spares and repairing an aircraft.  This too is like the car 
warranty analogy.  Fundamentally, when the customer’s warranty has run out, any repairs 
are their responsibility.  Now that the repairs are coming out of the car owner’s “budget”, 
they will most likely only request essential repairs.  Hence, with the advent of DBOF, the 
revolving fund customer’s “warranty” had run out. 
 DWCF.  In late 1996, the Defense Working Capital Fund (DWCF) was formed 
through the reorganization of the one centrally managed DBOF fund into four separate 
funds: the Army Working Capital Fund (AWCF), the Air Force Working Capital Fund 
(AFWCF), the Navy Working Capital Fund (NWCF), and the Defense-wide Working 
Capital Fund.  According to the GAO, “This was done in order to clearly delineate the 
responsibilities of the military services and Defense components for managing functional 
 
11  
and financial aspects of their respective business areas” (GAO, 1997:1). The business 
areas this statement refers to were established in April 1993.  These ten areas consisted of 
“relatively homogenous activities” in supply, depot maintenance, transportation, 
communication, finance, information services, distribution, base support, Navy Labs, and 
other (Jordan, 1995:39-40).  Other goals of the DWCF, as described in Chapter 2 of the 
DWCF Handbook, are as follows: 
• Providing a better way to control the costs of goods and services  
• Providing managers with increased flexibility and fiscal authority  
• Enhance reporting to provide true cost visibility  
 
Though the dissolution of DBOF did not change the way the revolving funds did 
business, it did provide even greater cash management while more clearly defining each 
of the military component’s roles in the fund (DWCF Handbook: Ch2).   
AFWCF.  When DWCF was initially established it was broken into four 
divisions:  the Army WCF, the Navy WCF, the Air Force WCF and Other DoD WCF.  
Each of these divisions had the authority to further disseminate their division into logical, 
manageable activity groups.  This research concerns the AFWCF and its activity groups.  
In FY02, the AFWCF is expected to generate $20.5 billion of the $74.5 billion in revenue 
expected by the DWCF (Cerda, 2002).  Today the AFWCF is comprised of the Supply 
Management Activity Group (SMAG), the Depot Maintenance Activity Group (DMAG), 
and the Information Services Activity Group (ISAG).  Furthermore, the AFWCF is 
responsible for the cash management of the United States Transportation Command’s 
(USTRANSCOM) Transportation Working Capital Fund (TWCF).  Because this is the 
only function the Air Force has with the TWCF, it is rarely included in AFWCF studies.  
However, it will be included simply to show how this WCF is operating.  Each of these 
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activity groups has a unique mission and more often than not, is tied to one of the other 
activity groups in a quite confusing fashion.  In fact, the AFWCF activity groups are 
often one another’s largest customers.  However, before discussing their relationships 
with one another, an introduction to their purpose is necessary.   
 SMAG.  The Supply Management Activity Group (SMAG) has the responsibility 
of providing inventory items, medical supplies, and various other support services and 
materials (FMRS, Ch. 80).  The SMAG was expected to generate $9.0 billion in revenue 
in fiscal year 2002.  It is broken into four divisions, each handling a specific aspect of the 
SMAG.  They include the Materiel Support Division (MSD), the General Support 
Division (GSD), the Medical-Dental Division (MDD), and the Air Force Academy Store 
Division (ACSD).  Each division sells its goods or services to other Air Force 
organizations and other AFWCF activity groups.  MSD, the largest of the SMAG 
divisions, is the wholesale division responsible for managing over 132,000 items in 
inventory for aircraft, missiles and engines with expected revenues of $5.9 billion.  It is 
also responsible for supplying initial spares for Depot Level Reparables (DLR) to the 
DMAG and purchases repair services from DMAG to make repair on exchangeable 
DLRs so they can be returned to inventory.  MSD works with DMAG at the Air Logistics 
Centers across the Nation (Cerda, 2002).  All remaining divisions of SMAG are retail 
divisions.  The GSD provides over 2.2 million consumable parts to its base and depot 
level customers through the Defense Logistics Agency.   It’s expected to produce $1.9 
billion in revenue in fiscal year 2002.  The MDD maintains in excess of 2500 items 
across 83 bases through the Medical Logistics Office with expected revenues of $0.9 
billion.  Finally, the ACSD maintains and sells uniform items for Air Force Academy 
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cadets at the United States Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, CO.  This entity is 
the smallest of the four and has had no problems breaking even from year to year.  
FY02 SMAG Revenue
$ (Billions)
$5.9
$1.9
$0.9
$0.3
MSD
GSD
MDD
ACSD
 
Figure 3.  Projected SMAG Revenue- FY02 
 
DMAG.  According to the Air Force Working Capital Fund Overview, the Depot 
Maintenance Activity Group (DMAG) is responsible for providing support at the depot-
level for “repair and modification of aircraft, missiles, and equipment; the overhaul of 
engines and exchangeables; local manufacture; and area and base tenant support.” It 
generates approximately thirty percent of the AFWCF revenue.  And, it supports 
operations from Air Logistics Centers (ALC) located throughout the United States: the 
Warner-Robins ALC (WR-ALC), Robins AFB, GA; the Ogden ALC (OO-ALC) located 
at Hill AFB, UT; and the Oklahoma City ALC (OC-ALC) at Tinker AFB, OK.  Each of 
these divisions is responsible for several types of weapons systems.  For instance, when a 
KC-135 needs repairs, it is sent to the OC-ALC.  When an F-15 needs modifications it is 
sent to the WR-ALC.  It is also important to note that the DMAG has both organic repair 
facilities and contract repair facilities. The organic facilities generate 60 percent of the 
DMAG revenue with the inorganic facilities generating the remaining 40 percent. DMAG 
has control over what prices are charged for the organic facilities but prices charged by 
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the contract facilities are set in the binding contract with the Air Force or Department of 
Defense. 
FY02 DMAG Revenue
$ (Billions)
$3.7
$2.5
Organic
Inorganic
 
Figure 4.  Projected DMAG Revenue- FY02 
 ISAG.  Finally, the Information Services Activity Group is the provider of 
information services and information technology solutions for the Air Force.   
Particularly, this AG analyzes requirements, designs and develops systems, and performs 
testing and integration for its customers along with support services.  It generates the 
smallest amount of revenue for the AFWCF with an expected FY02 generation of only 
$0.6 billion (Cerda, 2002).  The ISAG is separated into two divisions, each generating 
approximately equal revenues, known as the Central Design Agencies (CDA): the 
Materiel Systems Group (MSG), and the Standard Systems Group (SSG).   
FY02 ISAG Revenue
$ (Billions)
$0.3
$0.3
MSG
SSG
 
Figure 5.  Expected ISAG Revenue- FY02 
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As its name implies, SSG has the responsibility of supporting base level computer 
systems Air Force wide.  On the other hand, MSG is responsible for maintaining the 
logistics systems within the Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) (AFWCF Overview, 
80-7). 
The Relationship 
The workings of the AFWCF could be described as an “incestuous relationship”.  
All the Activity Groups require goods and services from one another.  As such, the 
transfer of goods or services to each other creates cyclical funds transfers.  An 
oversimplified example of the relationship between the activity groups follows: 
1.  Customer orders part from Supply (SMAG) with program sustained by ISAG 
2.  SMAG checks inventory for part and if part is in stock, issues it and bills          
customer; otherwise, requests it from DMAG 
3.  DMAG sends part to SMAG and bills SMAG for part 
4.  SMAG sends part to customer and bills customer for part 
5.  ISAG supported programs track parts and inventory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.  AFWCF Relationship 
As one can plainly see from the example, each of the Activity Groups relies on the others 
to get their job done.  And, though the process seems simple enough in the example, it is 
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hardly that.  In fact, the entire AFWCF process is a delicate balance of give and take on 
all sides.  This research examines the rate setting process of the Materiel Support 
Division of the Supply Management Activity Group.  
Pricing  
 Pricing is a means for an organization to meet its goals and objectives.  As those 
goals and objectives differ, so does the way a price is built.  Pricing accurately can lead to 
a successful business while inaccurate pricing can lead to destruction.  “Setting a price, 
just any price, is easy”, (Engelson, 1995: 6).  Although this statement is true, it fails to 
mention that price is directly related to the revenue it generates.  Daly suggests there are 
three possible outcomes of establishing prices.  First, setting prices above what 
consumers will tolerate may drive customers elsewhere and send revenues down.  
Second, setting prices too low (under pricing) may increase sales yet make the sale 
unprofitable.  Finally, the most sought after outcome occurs when prices are set properly, 
resulting in sales and profits (Daly, 2002: 1).   It appears that the AFWCF is the victim of 
inappropriate pricing.  Though the Fund does not operate on the premise of making a 
profit, the continual losses from year to year indicate that it can’t even operate as 
intended, on a break-even basis.  And, to recoup the prior years losses and try again to 
break-even, it must in fact set its prices with profit in mind; profit being equal to the 
amount of the previous years losses.  So, in order for the Fund to meet its break-even 
goal, it must price with profit in mind.  Yet, how realistic is it to expect the fund to break-
even at all? 
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Pricing Strategy 
 “Price is the value or worth of something”, (Engelson, 1995: 20).  “Strategy is the 
coordination of multiple activities to achieve a common objective…” (Holden and Nagle, 
2002: 149).  Together, these definitions imply that a pricing strategy must accurately 
value the organization’s goods and/or services, while striving to attain corporate goals.  It 
is important to note that price setting and strategic pricing are different.  Holden and 
Nagle identify that price setting is “reacting to market conditions” while pricing 
strategically is being proactive in managing prices (Holden and Nagle, 2002: 149).   
These differences can either send a company’s profits soaring or launch them straight 
into bankruptcy.  If the AFWCF were a public corporation, it would have filed 
bankruptcy long ago.  Most organizations cannot tolerate the sustained losses experienced 
by the AFWCF.  As of 1997, the total losses for the DWCF had topped $1.7 billion.  
Thus, the pricing strategy utilized by the AFWCF, or any corporation for that matter, is 
imperative to its success. 
 Most companies set their prices on a cost-plus foundation where they set prices by 
summing all direct and indirect costs, then add an additional percentage above the price 
solely for profit.  This is not the goal of the AFWCF.  O’Guin (1991) states that “pricing 
reflects each competitor’s costs, barriers to entry and capacity, as well as customer 
desirability, available income, and other factors” (O’Guin, 1991: 256).   
 The authors of Consumer Behavior and Marketing Behavior have developed a 
six-stage approach to developing a pricing strategy.  Most elements stated by O’Guin 
(1991) are reflected in this process.  They claim that their approach is different from the 
traditional approaches to strategic pricing in that their process focuses more on consumer 
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analysis (Olson and Peter, 1996: 593).  The approach, as presented by the authors, is as 
follows: 
1.  Analyze consumer-product relationships. 
2.  Analyze the environmental situation. 
3.  Determine the role of price in marketing strategy 
4.  Estimate relevant production and marketing costs. 
5.  Set pricing objectives. 
6.  Develop pricing strategy and set prices. 
Though this approach is meant primarily for the private sector, several stages are 
pertinent to the AFWCF as well.  An analysis of each step follows. 
Step 1: Analyze Consumer-Product Relationships 
 The first step in the strategic pricing approach is perhaps the most important.  
This step is where you determine what the consumers needs are and how they affect your 
product.  In the case of the AFWCF, this step is synonymous to obtaining customer 
requirements at the beginning of the two-year price-setting process.  Since total costs are 
divided by the number of requirements to obtain the AFWCF rates, you can see how this 
step can either raise rates out of control by customers underestimating their requirements, 
or rates can end up lower than needed to recoup all costs if customers underestimate their 
requirements.  This is shown in Table 1 below. 
Table 1.  Requirements Estimation Example 
  Overestimated Underestimated 
  Requirements Requirements 
Total Costs ($) 1,000,000 1,000,000 
# Of Engines 
Required 7 3 
Price per Engine ($) 142,857 333,333 
 
 
As you can see from this simple example, the customer has a significant impact on what 
they will be charged.  Specifically, it would be in the best interest of the customer to 
overestimate requirements.  If only one organization overestimates their workload the 
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impact to the overall AFWCF would be insignificant.  However, what happens if several 
organizations overestimate their requirements for several years?  This may be what is 
causing the AFWCF to lose money each year.  The point is the consumer plays a massive 
role in determining the financial health of the AFWCF.  
Step 2: Analyze the Environmental Situation 
 Environmental elements should also be considered when determining what 
pricing strategy to use.   Early consideration of these elements can bring to light risk 
factors so proactive measures can be taken.  This step is primarily used to obtain 
information about competitors in the market.  For instance, it is necessary to know how 
many competitors your company faces along with any pertinent information about their 
products, price structure, and financial strength (Olson and Peter, 1996: 596).  But, it can 
also be used to consider the customer’s impact on the environment.  For instance, in the 
AFWCF environment, the customer is working with a limited budget.  Once those 
monies are expended, they will not purchase any more services.  So, it’s important to 
realize that price determines the workload in the depots.  If prices are too high, the 
customer will not be able to send as many aircraft through the depots for repairs or 
modifications.  On the other hand, if the prices are too low, the customer may send more 
workload to the product centers than originally intended thus exceeding the maximum 
workload of the centers.  There is a fine balance between many factors that must be taken 
into account.    
Determining what value the customer places on the product or service will aid in 
identifying an appropriate pricing strategy.  The value a customer places on an item is 
actually a compilation of several factors including product or service quality, costs and 
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intangible costs and benefits.  It is important to understand this mix and adjust the price 
accordingly  (Ferrell et al., 2002: 130).  The customer’s value can be viewed as an output 
of this formula:  
stsCustomerConefitsCustomerBealuePerceivedV ÷=  
This stage of the strategic pricing approach is not as important to the AFWCF as 
to commercial businesses. First of all, the AFWCF does not have many competitors in its 
“market”.  In essence, the AFWCF works like a monopoly.  It has goods or services that 
cannot be obtained outside of the DoD or its contractors.  Because of this situation, its 
customers must rely on the AFWCF to set prices that will allow them to meet the needs 
of the warfighter.  Therefore, the value that the customer places on the products are not as 
important in the price setting scheme because more often than not they have to purchase 
the product from an internal source.  As expected, the environmental elements of the 
AFWCF are considerably different than those encountered by the private sector.   
Some additional environmental factors include: 
• Current and Future Threats  
o Where and when will the DoD be called upon to respond?   
• Technology Advancements 
o Advances in technology are continually occurring and must be 
addressed to remain superior 
• Contract Modifications 
o Changes to current agreements with DoD Suppliers of goods and 
services 
• Budget Constraints/Cuts 
o Money is continually being shuffled from one program to another  
 
Step 3: Determine the Role of Price in Marketing Strategy 
 This step helps the company determine the role price plays in their ability to sell 
their product.  There are different strategies used to gain a better hold on the market.  For 
instance, if a company wants to flood the market with their item, they may price it lower 
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than their competitor to gain sales and notoriety.  It is important to understand, however, 
that the price of a product may not always play a role in its sale.  There are several other 
aspects of sales that customers may prefer like free shipping, high quality products or 
extended warranties that override a higher price (Olson and Peter, 1996: 597). 
Determining the importance of price is also essential to the success of any pricing 
strategy.  One source suggests two specific reasons why pricing gets so much attention.  
First, revenue is easy to understand.  Unlike many other aspects of marketing, revenue 
has little complexity to it; it is simply price times quantity.  As such, there are only two 
ways that a company can increase its revenue: by increasing the quantity it sells or raising 
the selling price.  Both, however, are profoundly controlled by price.  Second, 
management views price as one of the easiest variables to influence.   Ferrell et al. (2002) 
imply that since price is the easiest aspect to change, it gets the most attention.  The time 
it takes to change a product design can take months or years.  Prices in the commercial 
sector can be raised with little effort or thought.  Think of the last time you drove by a gas 
station in the morning to see one price and drove by in the evening to see yet another 
price.  It is the effortlessness of changing prices that can wreak havoc on a company’s 
pricing posture.  And, more often than not, rapidly adjusting prices to vary to demand 
does not mean that the company is accurately setting prices.  They are simply reacting to 
the immediate situation (Ferrell et al., 2002: 128).     
The AFWCF is in a unique position when it comes to their marketing strategy.  
First, as mentioned before, the consumer plays a large role in price development by 
submitting product and service requirements at the beginning of the AFWCF budget 
process.   Second, the AFWCF market is very small due to the monopolistic nature of the 
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business.  The only areas truly affected by an outside market are the GSD and MDD of 
the SMAG.  Both of these divisions sell products that are readily available from private 
businesses.  Finally, the marketing strategy is one that it is constrained by laws, 
regulations and directives.  There is not much leeway when it comes to the options the 
AFWCF has to operate its business-like structure. 
Step 4: Estimate Relevant Production and Marketing Costs 
 Concerning production and marketing costs, Olson and Peter do not give enough 
consideration to this area.  They simply state that knowing the costs of marketing and 
production will enable the company to regard the variable prices of products, thus 
enabling them to determine the minimum price they must charge to enter the market 
(Olson and Peter, 1996: 597).   
 Though this area received little attention by Olson and Peter, and may not be of 
great importance in the private sector, it is of great interest to the AFWCF.  The accurate 
estimation of workload and supply requirements is the key to a successful AFWCF.  By 
accurately estimating workload, rates will be set close to where they should be.  
However, no estimate is accurate!  By using historical data and identifying past 
deficiencies, future prices can be set more accurately.  Granted, there are several 
unknowns when setting prices two-years in advance of the budget execution year but this 
risk can be managed with proper price setting techniques that will be discussed later.  
This also goes back to step two, where the environmental factors are evaluated.  The 
military does not operate in a vacuum.  There are new challenges every day that force 
personnel and systems to adapt. By identifying the key areas where change may occur 
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with the most adverse affects, you have taken a proactive approach to correctly 
identifying accurate costs. 
Step 5: Set Pricing Objectives 
 Perhaps the most crucial step prior to developing the pricing strategy is setting the 
pricing objectives.  A company must identify its goals in order for it to obtain them. 
Olson and Peter (1996) identified the top pricing objectives used by the private sector 
today.  They pointed out that the most common one is realizing a specific return on 
investment.  Other objectives include increasing sales, maximizing long run and short run 
profits, growth, targeting a market share and desensitizing the customer to price (Olsen 
and Peter, 1996: 598).  Each objective meets the needs of a different corporate strategy.  
The AFWCF uses the objective of breaking-even over time. It is also appropriate to 
attempt to desensitize customers to the price.  The less the customer feels angst about the 
price of the goods or services, the more business the depot receives and the better the 
chances are that the AFWCF will be close to breaking even.   There are too many fixed 
costs in organizations like the ALCs.  Civilian Pay and Benefits is one expense in the 
ALCs that does not change in proportion to the workload.  They must have enough 
personnel on hand to manage the expected workload.  And due to policies governing 
civilian personnel, lay-offs are not an option.  When their workload decreases, their costs 
remain the same, so a loss will most definitely occur.  Yet it may be impossible to 
desensitize the AFWCF customers to price since most of them are working within limited 
budget constraints set forth by the Congress. 
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Step 6: Develop Pricing Strategy and Set Prices 
The pricing strategy is the key element in determining either the success or failure 
of a company.  Once all the other steps have been accomplished, it is necessary to choose 
a pricing strategy that will aid the company in achieving its goals.  With the private sector 
in mind, Olson and Peter (1996) listed three tasks necessary to produce an applicable 
pricing strategy.  First, prices must be set far enough above costs to produce the level of 
revenue desired.  Second, choose a pricing strategy that is in harmony with the marketing 
strategy.  Last, the prices must be strategically set so demand is generated while keeping 
in mind that the customer will have the opportunity to make trade-off decisions.  
Furthermore, the corporation must remember that “most price changes occur as a result of 
changes in consumers, the environment, competition, costs, strategies, and objectives”, 
(Olson and Peter, 1996: 599). 
Pricing Methods 
The choice of pricing method depends on the many factors mentioned above.  
What follows are several pricing strategies commonly used today.  However, it is 
important to keep in mind that many of these strategies might not work for the AFWCF.  
This is because (1) the AFWCF operates to recover its costs only, (2) AFWCF customers 
have a limited budget that is often only adjusted downward, (3) the “market” the AFWCF 
operates in is autonomous, and (4) the AFWCF implements transfer pricing due to its 
relationship with primarily internal customers.  This portion of the chapter will focus on 
identifying pricing strategies that are principally based around the transfer-pricing 
concept including Cost-Based pricing, Cost-Plus pricing, Rate-of-Return pricing, Market-
Based pricing, Value-Based Pricing and Activity Based Costing.  
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Internal Transfer Pricing 
 Internal transfer pricing is a common category of pricing often used by companies 
to avoid taxation of sales of products to its other divisions.  Transfer pricing is a “system 
of pricing the transfer of goods, services and intangibles between entities of one 
multinational enterprise” (Pagan and Wilkie, 2001: 15).  A transfer price is simply a 
mechanism for pricing products sold from one division of a company to another division 
of the same company.  In the case of the AFWCF, a sale to a DoD customer should be 
sold with a transfer price.  Similarly, a sale from the MSD to the DMAG is also a transfer 
price.  Revenue is created from the sale of the product from MSD and constitutes an 
expense as a buy for the DMAG.  The operating income of both of these internal 
organizations is affected by the same transaction.  One source asserts that transfer pricing 
should “promote goal congruence and a sustained high level of management effort” 
(Datar et al., 2000: 793).  These factors are inline with the goals and operations of the 
AFWCF.  As such, the type of transfer price used deserves as much scrutiny as external 
pricing does.     
Common Transfer Pricing Strategies 
Cost-Based Pricing 
 This pricing method uses the cost of producing the product or service to set the 
price.  The full-cost of the product is included in the price.  Factors include fixed and 
variable costs of the product along with direct and indirect production costs.  Most often 
the price is set by using the budgeted costs of an item because collecting actual cost data 
can be time consuming and too costly  (Datar et al., 2001: 794).  There are two 
approaches under cost-based pricing that will be discussed briefly: cost- plus and rate-of-
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return.  Each has similar goals but distinct differences.  And though the cost-based 
approach is simple, its major weakness is that it fails to take into account any of the 
external market factors such as value or demand, making it difficult for management to 
determine how much it will sell.   However, it is suitable to use this method when 
obtaining market data is too time consuming or too costly (Datar et al., 2001: 797-799). 
Cost-Plus Pricing  
The goal of cost-plus pricing is to make a profit.   As mentioned earlier, cost-plus 
strives to account for all costs associated with a product and then adds a rate to the 
average variable costs (Cintron, 2002: 9).  This rate recovers any indirect costs associated 
with the product and includes any profit the company wishes to make.  The benefit of this 
method is the seller knows how much profit it makes from the sale of each item.   
Rate-of-Return Pricing 
This method is very similar to the cost-plus method above.  However, the 
difference lies in the fact that instead of arbitrarily marking up the price to make a profit, 
the price is increased to reach a desired rate-of-return.  Cintron (2002) does a thorough 
job of explaining this method in his thesis.  He uses the following example: 
“Suppose a manufacturer has the following costs and sales expectations:   
 Variable cost per unit  $          10 
 Fixed cost      300,000 
 Expected unit sales       50,000 
The manufacturer’s unit cost is given by: 
 Unit cost = variable cost + (fixed costs/units sales)  
   = $10 + ($300,000/50,000) = $16 
Now assume the manufacturer wants to earn a 20 percent markup on sales.  The 
manufacturer’s markup price is given by: 
 Mark-up price = unit cost / (1-desired return on sales) = $16 / (1-0.20) = $20 
The manufacturer would charge $20 per product and make a profit of $4 per unit 
(Cintron, 2002: 9).” 
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Though both of these methods are widely used and easy to understand and explain, they 
are not the best methods for pricing.  Neither of them takes into account value, demand or 
competition.  As a result, the seller never knows if they will reach their desired rate-of 
return or profit level (Kotler, 2000: 466). 
Market-Based Pricing 
 The strength of market-based pricing is the demise of cost-based pricing.  This 
method of accounting focuses on how customers react to fluctuations in the price and 
concentrates on the market conditions.  Two examples of market-based pricing are 
explained below.   
Value-Based Pricing 
 This method of pricing falls inline with steps two and three of Olsen and Peters 
(1996) strategic pricing method.  This strategy sets prices based on the perception the 
customer has of the value of the product.  Value is a relative term that has different 
meanings for all consumers.  It is a mix of everything the customer values in your 
product.  Recall the perceived value formula earlier in this chapter.  It says that value 
is equal to customer benefits divided by customer costs.  Ferrell et al’s list of possible 
benefit and cost components is below.  
As one can see, the components in Figure 7 encompass almost every aspect of an 
organization.  Put simply, the main premise of this method is that the consumer 
strives to get the “biggest bang for the buck.”  Holding all the components constant, a 
consumer will buy from the store with the lowest price.  It is the value of the 
components that lead to trade-off decisions and ultimately a sale.  For instance, 
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suppose that there are two products available from different manufacturers for the 
same price.  Since price is no longer an issue for the consumer, they will turn to  
  Customer Benefits   Customer Costs 
Core Product Quality   Monetary Costs 
Product Features    Transactional Costs 
Brand Name    Retail of wholesale price 
Durability    Delivery Charges 
Ease of Use    Sales Tax 
Warranties and Guarantee   Licensing Fees 
Customer Service Quality   Life Cycle Costs 
Reliability    Maintenance Costs 
Responsiveness    Repair Costs 
Timeliness    Replacement Costs 
Experience-Based Quality   Nonmonetary Costs 
Retail Atmosphere and décor  Time 
Advertising and Publicity   Effort 
Entertainment Benefits   Risk 
      Opportunity Costs 
 
Figure 7.  Components of Customer Benefits and Customer Costs 
 (Ferrell et al, 2002: 102) 
 
other aspects of the product or product’s company to make their purchase decision.  
Perhaps company A has a reputation for great customer service and prompt attention 
to problems, while the other company’s product is a relatively unknown brand name 
or has a reputation of not being very durable.  The consumer will most likely choose 
company A.  It is this information that it necessary for the company to accurately set 
its prices.  It needs to know not only what the customer’s perceived value is, but also 
the perceived value of the other competitor’s in the market (Ferrell et al., 2002, 102).   
Activity Based Costing 
 Although outside the realm of price setting, Activity Based Costing (ABC) can 
play a vital role in the price setting process, particularly when it comes to cost-based 
pricing.  Prices are only as good as the cost allocation method associated with it.  ABC is 
a method used to allocate indirect costs to products or product lines.  The most common 
method or allocation of indirect costs is to arbitrarily spread the support costs of an 
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operation across all products and product lines at the same rate, perhaps 15% is added to 
all products to cover overhead costs. This method of allocating costs is flawed in that it 
often allocates too much overhead to one product and not enough to another.  This leads 
to under pricing and overpricing of goods and services, which will affect revenue 
generation. 
 With ABC, overhead costs are allocated to the appropriate products or product 
lines that are creating the indirect costs.  There is no more “peanut butter spreading” of 
the costs to all products.  For instance, there are more costs associated with holding an 
engine in inventory than holding a bolt.  The engine takes up more floor space and should 
be allocated more of the inventory warehouse costs.  Using ABC can assist an 
organization in finding out what the true cost drivers are in the company and lead to more 
accurate pricing.  However, ABC is often expensive and difficult to implement.  Before 
an ABC method is used in conjunction with a pricing method, a cost-benefit analysis 
must be performed to see if the expected benefits will outweigh the expected costs.   
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III. Methodology 
 
Overview 
 The methodology behind this research effort was an exploratory study of the 
AFWCF.  To answer questions about the overall health of the AFWCF, a multiple case 
study was used where the activity groups of the AFWCF were each a case: these included 
SMAG, DMAG, ISAG and TWCF.  Comparisons of the NOR were evaluated among the 
groups so conclusions about the efficiency of their operations and accuracy of their 
pricing strategy could be made.  The focus then switched to a single case study of the 
Materiel Support Division’s pricing strategy compared against commercial best practices.  
With this approach, we were able to focus on what was motivating the continually 
growing Accumulated Operating Result (AOR).  Throughout the research effort, 
concentration was aimed at obtaining answers to the research questions outlined in 
Chapter 1.   
Research Design 
 The most important step when determining which research approach to use is the 
definition of the research questions (Yin, 1994: 7).  This particular research builds on a 
March 2002 thesis written by First Lieutenant Edwin Cintron, An Analysis of the Pricing 
Strategy of a Government Fee-For-Service Organization.  Cintron’s (2002) research 
focused on the pricing strategy of the Materiel Support Group, a division of the ISAG.  
The author studied this primarily service oriented organization and found that the 
accuracy of its pricing strategy is limited by its inability to make changes in a timely 
fashion, due in large part to the restrictions forced on it by the DoDFMR.  He further 
points out that it may be beneficial to research other areas of the AFWCF and see what 
 
31  
type of impact they have on meeting the objectives of the DWCF.  As such, this research 
was born.   
 The next step determined which research strategy to use.  Yin suggests that there 
are three conditions that will aid in determining which strategy to use: “(a) the type of 
research questions, (b) the control the investigator has over the actual behavioral events 
and (c) the focus on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context” (Yin, 
1994: 1).  The fact that this research asks how and why questions, the researchers have no 
control over the events and it focuses on contemporary events leads to the archival 
analysis and the case study analysis.  However, the archival process should only be used 
when data is historical.  The data necessary for this analysis, though past data, is recent; 
and so, this study was deemed a multiple case study with a single case focus (Yin, 1994: 
5-7). 
Data Collection 
 The data collection phase of this research was an iterative process that used 
numerous resources.  The first step in answering the research questions was to obtain 
financial figures from fiscal years 1999 through 2002, in particular, the Budget Estimate 
Submission (BES) for the Air Force Working Capital Fund.  These documents provided   
expected and actual revenues and expenditures along with bottom-line figures for the 
AOR and NOR.  The NOR is the Net Operating Result of the fund each year.  If this 
number is negative, the fund has lost money and it must be recouped in a subsequent 
year.  If it is positive at the end of the fiscal year, there is a surplus that will be absorbed 
back into the fund, resulting in lower prices to the customers.  The AOR is the 
Accumulated Operating Result, which is the sum of the NORs since the funds inception.  
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The AOR and NOR are the measures for the health of the AFWCF.  It is these figures 
that we want as close to zero as possible from year to year.   
 Next, to analyze the operations of the Materiel Support Division, the current 
pricing strategy of the division, along with any proposed changes, had to be identified.  
This information was obtained from SAF/FMBMR and HQ AFMC/LGIF.  A 
comparative analysis was then performed to determine if MSD was inline with 
commercial best practices outlined in the literature review.  
 In addition to gathering numerical data, it was essential to interview personnel 
working in the WCF field to collect information not readily available through other 
avenues such as reports, regulations and directives.  The hands-on experience of these 
personnel provided valuable insight into the business operations of the AFWCF.  
Valuable information was also gathered at the Air Force Working Capital Fund Summit 
at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in October 2002, and at the Cost-Per Flying Hour 
Conference in Columbus, Ohio in September 2002.   
Data Analysis 
 Like the data collection phase, and even more so, the data analysis phase of this 
research was an iterative process.  The first step in the analysis was to use the data from 
the BES to determine the overall position of the AFWCF.  This was done by simply 
graphing the AOR and NOR data included in the BES.  The next step was to graph the 
AOR and NOR data for each of the four activity groups: SMAG, DMAG, ISAG and 
TWCF.  This illustrated which of the funds was having the most difficult time meeting 
the goal of breaking even and outlined which activity groups could be driving the Fund’s 
performance.   After the visual inspection, a bivariate correlation was conducted amongst 
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the AFWCF and each of its activity groups.  This helped determine which areas, if any, 
were true statistically significant drivers of the AFWCF’s overall performance.   
 Then, the scope was altered to establish how accurate the initial estimates were 
when compared to actual revenues and expenses.  By computing a growth factor for each 
of the activity groups at the Total Income and Total Expense levels as outlined in the 
BES, a determination was made as to how the Fund was operating.  Again, statistical 
analysis was performed to test the significance of the results.   
 Finally, estimating consistencies were identified among the specific revenue and 
expense categories for each of the activity groups and the average over or under 
estimation was computed.  A consistency was defined as a revenue or expense category 
that was being either overestimated for all years being reviewed or underestimated during 
all years under review.  If an activity group underestimated a category in one year and 
overestimated that same category in a different year, it was not considered to be 
consistent.  After identifying which areas were consistent estimating problems for the 
activity groups, common categories among all the activity groups was identified.  The 
goal was to determine if there was an area of the budget process that needed more 
attention.  Perhaps personnel are not as accurate at determining the requirements or prices 
as they thought.   
 Data analysis for the MSD portion of this study was conducted in conjunction 
with the literature review.  This resulted in a comparative analysis of MSD’s pricing 
strategy to Olsen and Peter’s (1996) six-step pricing process.  The primary goal of this 
part was to determine if MSD is aligned with commercial best pricing practices. 
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Summary 
 This research employs both a multiple-case and a single-case study design with 
the four activity groups of the AFWCF contained in the multiple-case study and the 
Materiel Support Division of the Supply Management Activity Group as the case in the 
single case study.  The case study was considered most appropriate due to the type of 
questions being asked, the lack of control over the events and the context of the case.  
Data collection was obtained through databases, interviews and documents.  While data 
analysis was accomplished through a comparison of budgeted and actual data along with 
statistical verification or results. 
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IV. Analysis 
Overview 
 This research endeavor focused on several aspects of the Air Force Working 
Capital Fund.  First, its purpose was to determine if the goals of the DWCF were 
reflected in the current pricing strategies of the AFWCF based on the AFWCF’s 
performance.  Second, it examined how the pricing strategies of the AFWCF activity 
groups differ and seeks to determine if any of the Activity Groups are able to break even.  
Finally, based on current commercial pricing practices, determine if the current pricing 
strategy of the Materiel Support Division of the Supply Management Activity Group, the 
largest single division of the AFWCF, can be improved upon while making suggestions 
where the Air Force should focus it improvement efforts.  Responses to these questions 
will provide insight into the implications behind an appropriate pricing strategy and aid in 
educating the AFWCF community. 
AFWCF Performance 
The majority of DoD literature encountered during this investigation stated in one 
way or another that the WCF was failing to operate as intended.  Yet, none of this 
literature stated whether or not the changes the WCF has been encountering in the past 
few years has resulted in a positive or negative impact on the fund, due in part to the fact 
that the only acceptable performance of the Fund is when it is able to break-even.  So, the 
first step in determining if the goals of the DWCF are reflected in the current pricing 
strategies was to analyze past performance data.  This will enable us to see where the 
AFWCF is working and where improvements can be made.  We will first look at the 
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AFWCF and its activity groups in their broadest sense and then delve down into more 
explanatory aspects like revenues and expenses.   
The Net Operating Result, NOR, is undoubtedly the most important indicator of 
the effectiveness of the AFWCF operation.  Recall that this is the variance between the 
expected results and the actual results in a single year.  When there is a positive NOR in a 
given year, this money will be returned to the fund in a subsequent year, ultimately 
driving down prices customers pay in the short run.  However, and as equally often the 
case, the NOR is a negative amount (Figure 8). This means that the Fund’s total expenses 
have surpassed its total revenue.  This money must be recouped in a subsequent year, 
thus artificially raising prices the customers are charged.  This artificial inflation of prices 
creates undue hardship on the customers of the Fund.  Rather than paying a fair price for 
goods or services, they are paying prices that are often higher than their budgets will 
allow and higher than prices found in the commercial sector.  This results in a reduction 
in the revenue the Fund will receive since customers are unable to purchase as many 
goods or services at the inflated rate, which ultimately drives the Fund’s loss.  Or, 
revenue is lost due to the customer purchasing their goods from the private sector if 
available.   
The other measure of the AFWCF’s position from year to year is the 
Accumulated Operating Result (AOR).  This number is the cumulative gain or loss since 
the inception of the fund in 1991.  One would think that due to the regulatory 
requirements set forth by the Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation 
(DoDFMR) that the AOR would have to be zero every year.  The reason there is a 
balance in this category is due to the lag in recovering the NOR.  By the time it is 
 
37  
determined that FY00 has a negative NOR for the year, it is too late to recover it in FY01 
because this budget has already been approved and execution has begun for FY01.  So, 
the AOR rides until the next fiscal year where it is supposed to be recovered.  However, 
when FY02’s budget is executed, the NOR that had occurred in FY01 must either be 
recouped or reintroduced.  So, the cumulative loss of the fund can grow before anything 
is recovered.  This is what is often referred to as the downward death spiral.  The problem 
keeps getting worse, that is to say that the negative AOR keeps growing larger, before it 
has a chance to recover.  This problem has been recognized and over $1.2 billion was 
introduced into the Fund in fiscal year 2003 to zero out the AOR, thus balancing the Fund 
for the first time since its establishment.   
Yet, it is still important to recognize how well the fund has performed over the 
past few fiscal years.  This was accomplished by obtaining the NOR from Budget 
Estimate Submissions (BES) for fiscal years 1997 to 2001.  The results are displayed in 
Figure 8. 
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Figure 8.  AFWCF AOR & NOR (FY97-FY01) 
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 As one can see from the graph in Figure 8 above, there has been a great deal of 
fluctuation in the fund’s operation over the past fiscal years.  The NOR has an oscillating 
pattern with a decreasing trend.  The trendline shows that the variance in the annual NOR 
is decreasing as the Fund matures.  This suggests that the Fund is coming increasingly 
closer to operating as intended.  Still, some of the vast fluctuation can be explained by the 
fact that the prior year’s AOR is being recouped so the NOR is either a great deal larger 
or smaller than it should’ve been.  Technically, the NOR should be at zero once the 
previous year’s AOR has been recouped from or reintroduced into the Fund.  
 Two significant problems have been identified with the way the AFWCF or any 
of the DWCFs operate.  The first is the time lag between the initial budget submission 
and the budget execution.  In the FY97 BES, the estimators predicted that the FY99 NOR 
would be approximately -$83.5 million (Figure 9).  This however was based on the fact 
that the AOR at the end of FY98 was +$35.9 million.  By the time the FY97 budget was 
approved, the FY98 AOR had been updated to +$415.2 million and the FY99 NOR to      
-$390.3 million.  And, once the FY99 budget execution was completed, the FY98 AOR 
sat at +$289.1 and the FY99 NOR was +$214.1 million.   
$ Millions FY 99 Requested FY 99 Approved FY 99 Actual 
Revenues 19,247.981 19,404.879 19,645.718 
Expenses 19,373.819 19,221.631 19,529.049 
NOR (83.548) (390.324) 214.065 
Prior Year AOR 35.859 415.191 289.083 
Figure 9.  FY 99 AFWCF Operating Results 
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It is evident that the initial expectations of the Funds operation swing by as much as $372 
million when the initial estimations are compared to the acutals.  This is unacceptable by 
any standard.  Yet regrettably, it is mostly unavoidable.   
The timeline used by the Fund to set its prices is not only prescribed by laws and 
regulations, but is necessary to ensure that customers have enough lead time to build and 
submit their POMs so they can identify where they should spend their budgets.  On the 
other hand, when fluctuations are as widely distributed as they have been, it may be just 
as easy to use a best guess approach when submitting the initial estimates.  As with any 
estimation, they are just that, an estimate, and by definition they will never be 100% 
accurate because analysts are not fortunate enough to have a crystal ball   There are, of 
course, other ways to set prices but they do not take into account the large role the 
customer plays in the AFWCF. 
The second problem with the Fund is the way the AOR is recouped.  This has 
been a longstanding issue within the Fund.  In the early 1990s, the AOR just rode from 
year to year in the Fund, and got larger each year.  But this was soon recognized as a 
problem because the Fund was losing capital that wasn’t being recouped.  So, in the mid-
1990s, the AOR was required to be recouped from the Fund within the year of execution 
in an attempt to zero it out.   This was impossible to achieve due to the budget constraints 
of the customers.  The problem was that customers were budgeting for one amount and 
were being asked to pay a larger amount.  By raising these prices within the year of 
execution, customers were unable to purchase as many goods or services as they had 
initially projected in their POMs.  So, the AFWCF received less revenue than it had 
anticipated due to the decreased customer requirements but had many of the same 
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expenses.  This again increased the AOR negatively.  There appeared to be no solution to 
this problem that didn’t end up doing more harm than good.  Later, the AOR was 
recovered in a subsequent fiscal year.  This worked better because the AOR was now 
budgeted for in a later fiscal year.   Yet, there were still many unforeseen factors that 
arose causing the revenues or expenses to fluctuate widely from the anticipated amounts.  
Presently, one of the Activity Groups has undergone a change in the way the AOR is 
recouped that appears to have a very positive affect on the Fund.  This will be discussed 
in the MSD Pricing Strategy.   
 Recall that the NOR is recovered in a year after it is incurred.  Referring to the 
graph in Figure 8, in FY97, there was a loss of approximately $200 million in the NOR 
and then the FY99 AOR had a large increase.  Why such a large fluctuation?  If the Fund 
only needed to recoup $200 million, why was there a large spike in the Funds operating 
result the next year?  This may be the result of overcompensation.  In order to make up 
the negative funds lost in FY97, the AFWCF needed to recoup the money in FY99 which 
meant raising prices.  Maybe they raised the prices too high when incorporating the 
negative NOR into the Fund.   The behavior of the fund is erratic at best.  Perhaps this 
can be better explained by observing how the individual activity groups were performing 
during this same timeframe since the four activity group’s data were consolidated to 
arrive at the AFWCF’s results.   
 We expect to see the same erratic behavior in each of the activity groups as we 
have seen in the AFWCF.  With the exception of ISAG, a quick look at each of the 
activity group’s performance measures shows a similarly inconsistent pattern (Figure 10). 
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Figure 10.  Activity Group NORs 
When compared to Figure 8, we see that the consolidated NOR of the AFWCF most 
closely follows the pattern of the SMAG.  A look at each of the Activity Groups 
individually will provide a better understanding of their impact on the Fund as a whole.   
First, consider the SMAG data.  This is the largest of the Activity Groups so it is 
reasonable that any fluctuations in its operation have the largest impact on the Fund 
overall.  Notice in Figure 11 how the SMAG data trend closely resembles the AFWCF 
data.  This verifies the large effect the SMAG has on the AFWCF. 
Looking at the graph in Figure 12 shows the DMAG NOR against the AFWCF 
NOR.  The trend between the two is similar but does not provide evidence that DMAG is 
a large contributor to the Fund’s overall performance; it isn’t nearly as obviously driving 
the Fund’s outcome as the SMAG’s fluctuation is.      
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AFWCF NOR vs. SMAG NOR
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Figure 11.  AFWCF NOR vs. SMAG NOR 
  
AFWCF NOR vs. DMAG NOR
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Figure 12.  AFWCF NOR vs. DMAG NOR 
 Looking at the ISAG NOR below, there appears to be significantly less 
correlation than the previous two (Figure 13).  The ISAG NOR is so small in comparison 
to the entire AFWCF that it hardly shows up when compared against the AFWCF NOR 
in the same graph, in fact there appears to be no fluctuation at all.  Yet when viewed 
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alone, ISAG shows opposite patterns than the AFWCF NOR for fiscal years 97-99.  This 
suggests that ISAG is counteracting the NOR and is thus bringing it closer to zero. This is 
the desired impact of the Fund.  Unlike SMAG, this activity group appears to be aiding 
the AFWCF in attaining its goal of breaking even.   Unfortunately, its impact is minute 
due to the size of ISAG in comparison to the rest of the Fund. 
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Figure 13.  AFWCF NOR vs. ISAG NOR 
 Lastly, a comparison of the TWCF NOR against the AFWCF NOR shows another 
interesting trend.  The graph in Figure 14 illustrates the relationship between the two.  
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Figure 14.  AFWCF NOR vs. TWCF NOR 
Notice that the TWCF NOR, like SMAG, closely mirrors the AFWCF NOR.  This too 
shows that the TWCF could be a significant driver of the consolidated NOR.  Table 2 
below shows the actual contribution of each of the activity groups to the overall AFWCF 
NOR.  It is evident that based on the size of the different activity group operations, some 
contribute a great deal more than others.  
Table 2.  Individual NORs 
$ 
Millions DMAG SMAG ISAG TWCF AFWCF 
1997 (236.254) 28.639 4.092 (18.200) (221.723) 
1998 (34.636) 316.715 (7.419) 287.800 562.460  
1999 178.461 87.800 (0.996) (51.200) 214.065  
2000 (109.030) (95.211) (11.179) (183.200) (398.620) 
2001 (28.216) 206.036 (6.865) 15.700 186.655  
 
To confirm the contribution each of the activity groups makes to the overall 
operating result in the NOR, a bivariate correlation was run to identify which activity 
groups have had the greatest impact on the Fund.   This descriptive measure also 
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identified any correlation among the activity groups themselves.   The results are 
presented in Table 3. 
Table 3.  NOR Correlations and Significance Levels 
Correlation 
  DMAG SMAG ISAG TWCF AFWCF 
DMAG 1         
SMAG 0.286485 1       
ISAG -0.1384 -0.06181 1     
TWCF 0.067861 0.922708 0.002225 1   
AFWCF 0.543569 0.94694 -0.06374 0.864207 1 
Significance 
  DMAG SMAG ISAG TWCF AFWCF 
DMAG .      
SMAG 0.640 .     
ISAG 0.824 0.921 .    
TWCF 0.914 0.025 0.997 .   
AFWCF 0.344 0.015 0.919 0.059 . 
 
 
Use of a bivariate correlation function allowed for comparison among all pairs.  
Looking at the AFWCF correlation row, it appears that both the SMAG and TWCF are 
highly correlated to the AFWCF NOR while DMAG is moderately correlated and ISAG 
has a slight negative correlation.  To verify these findings it was necessary to observe the 
resulting p-values.  A correlation is said to be significant if its corresponding p-value is 
less than alpha.  In this case, the significance levels were tested against an alpha of 0.05 
and were instrumental in determining true statistical significance.   
 Based on the p-values presented above (Table 3), the only correlation that holds 
true is the relationship between the AFWCF and SMAG.  The p-value of 0.015 indicates 
that there is a statistically significant correlation among these factors.  However, the 
relationship between AFWCF and TWCF is very near the significance level with a 
returned p-value of 0.059.  Ordinarily, this would be further scrutinized to determine if 
significance really exists here but with so few data points (5) for comparison there is no 
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need.  A larger sample of NORs would yield different results and would more clearly 
identify if there were significance.   
 Finally, one other to point out is the statistically significant correlation among the 
SMAG and TWCF pair with a correlation coefficient of 0.923 and a p-value of 0.025.  
The best explanation for this result is that SMAG expends the largest amount of any of 
the activity groups on the transportation of people and things.  These expenditures 
directly relate to the revenue TWCF receives.  However, with so few data points in the 
model, a 0.846 correlation coefficient is not considered highly correlated nor is it 
statistically significant.    
Based on the information presented on the preceding pages, there is difficulty 
ascertaining whether or not the pricing strategies of the AFWCF reflect the goals of the 
DWCF.  Although all of the activity groups strive to come as close to breaking even as 
possible, their efforts are thwarted by the need to recoup the AOR and the regulatory 
constraints that are in place.  This being the case, it is necessary to look at the pricing 
strategy of each of the activity groups individually to determine if they are being a 
hindrance or help to the health of the DWCF.  Unfortunately, due to the time constraints 
of this research, only a small portion of the AFWCF was studied.  The AFWCF is a 
complicated process of give and take on the part of the customers and activity groups. 
Fully understanding the price setting process often takes those directly involved with the 
Fund years to comprehend.  There is a delicate balance between all parties involved and 
very often the actions of one affect many.  This is most often the case in the DMAG and 
SMAG relationship described earlier in the paper.  Therefore, we suggest that further 
research be conducted to look at each division of each activity group.  We have chosen to 
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focus our efforts on the pricing strategy of the Materiel Support Division of the SMAG.  
This will be discussed later in this chapter. 
In answering the second question of whether or not the activity groups have 
differing pricing strategies, the answer is yes.  As outlined in Chapter One, the price 
setting technique used by each activity group is prescribed by the DODFMR 7000.14R, 
Volume 2B, Chapter 9.  This document states that there are two ways to setting rates, 
based on whether the activity group is supply management-oriented or not.  The SMAG 
is a supply entity so its pricing strategy must incorporate the cost of its commodities 
along with a surcharge to establish the rates it will charge customers.  DMAG, ISAG and 
TWCF, on the other hand, are all service-oriented divisions.  Their rates are based on 
their respective output measures, such as direct labor hour or direct per standard hour.     
Although it is evident that only a couple of the Fund’s activity groups have a large 
affect overall, specific areas of the budget estimates (revenues and expenses) will be 
studied to identify any trend in the estimations.  This information will provide valuable 
insight into areas being consistently over or under estimated and those having a 
significant impact on the Fund.   
 The Budget Estimate Submission is a compilation of the expected revenues and 
expenses the Fund expects to generate in a given fiscal year.  It includes a compilation of 
the four activity groups’ data as well as each individual activity groups’ specific data.  
There is a general format that the revenues and expenses are reported in that all 
submissions have followed subsequent to FY97.  The activity groups report their 
operations in the categories shown in Figure 15.    
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Figure 15.  FY03 BES Sample 
 
 Each BES includes data in these categories in one of three fiscal years.  It includes 
the requested (expected) revenues and expenses for the fiscal year that is being budgeted, 
the approved budget amounts for the fiscal year prior and the actual revenues and 
expenditures for the fiscal year prior to that.  For example, the FY 2003 BES included the 
requested FY 2003 amounts (2003 R), the approved FY 2002 amounts (2002 AP), and 
the actual FY 2001 amounts (2001 AC).   
 After obtaining the BES’ for fiscal years 1997 – 2004, analysis of the differences 
between the requested and actuals, and the fluctuation in the requested and approved 
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amounts was examined across each of the activity groups.  This information was valuable 
in determining accuracy of the estimates, and whether or not there are areas of the 
AFWCF that are consistently estimated incorrectly; thus having a negative impact on the 
Funds operating result and preventing it from achieving its goal of breaking even.  It 
should however be stated that the Fund can never break-even and it is an impossibility to 
create an exact estimate.  In fact, the statistical probability of achieving 100% accuracy is 
zero.   
Examination of Estimate Accuracy 
According to many critics, one of the chief problems with the Fund is that it does 
not reach its goal of breaking even.  The next measure of the Fund’s performance was the 
accuracy of the initial estimates against the actual revenues and expenses.  First, a 
Revenue Growth Factor (RGF) and an Expense Growth Factor (EGF) were computed for 
each of the activity groups in fiscal years 1999 to 2002.  These values show whether the 
revenues or expenses were under or over estimated in a given year.  A Growth Factor 
value > 1 indicates that the initial estimate was less than the actual income or expenditure 
while a Growth Factor value < 1 indicates the opposite.  The impact to the activity group 
depends on the whether it is an expense or a revenue.  For instance, when a RGF is less 
than 1, the initial revenue estimate was less than the actual revenues recorded.  This 
difference creates a loss in the activity group.  On the other hand, when an EGF is less 
than 1, the initial expense estimate was also less than the actual expenses recorded but 
this creates a gain for the activity group.   
Examining tables 4 and 5, it is evident that there are large fluctuations in the 
estimates of the activity groups.  The group best at estimating revenues is TWCF with an 
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average RGF of 0.990, indicating that TWCF is generally within 1% of its initial 
estimate.  TWCF is also the most accurate when estimating expenses with an average 
EGF of 0.967, signifying that TWCF’s initial expense estimations are within 3.3% of the 
actual expenditures.  While TWCF experiences the least fluctuation, ISAG has averaged 
the worst fluctuations with an RGF and an EGF of 1.158 and 1.179 respectively.  
However, these values are overstated due to the largely inaccurate estimates in FY99 due 
primarily to the fact that this was one of the activity groups first years in existence and 
experienced many growing pains.  Their estimations since then have improved 
considerably.  Omitting the inflated data from FY99, the RGF and EGF are 1.053 and 
1.066 respectively.   
Table 4.  Revenue Growth Factors 
A RGF < 1 = initial < actual (Fund gains $) 
A RGF > 1 = initial > actual (Fund loses $) 
  2002 2001 2000 1999 Average 
SMAG 0.955 0.904 1.010 0.935 0.951 
DMAG 1.081 1.115 1.107 1.113 1.104 
ISAG 1.047 1.030 1.083 1.470 1.158 
TWCF 1.001 0.931 0.957 1.072 0.990 
 
Table 5.  Expense Growth Factors 
A EGF > 1 = initial < actual (Fund loses $) 
A EGF < 1  = initial > actual (Fund gains $) 
  2002 2001 2000 1999 Average 
SMAG 0.954 0.881 0.995 0.913 0.936 
DMAG 1.127 1.088 1.153 1.121 1.122 
ISAG 1.051 1.044 1.102 1.518 1.179 
TWCF 0.884 0.933 0.963 0.963 0.967 
 
Another detail to take note of is the consistent pattern in the activity groups:  
DMAG and ISAG are consistently overestimating revenue and underestimating expenses; 
SMAG primarily underestimates revenue and has always overestimated expenses.  
Fortunately, these inaccurate estimates are counteracting each other.  For example, in 
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FY01, DMAG projected revenues to be $5.05 billion and expenses to be $5.07 billion.  
Actual revenues ended up coming in at $5.63 billion; an increase in revenue of $0.58 
billion.  Actual expenses were reportedly higher than expected at $5.52 billion, an 
increase in expenses of $0.45 billion.  All but $0.13 billion of these errors are negated by 
the other category.  So, as long as one category is overestimated and the other 
underestimated, the activity group can counter the effect of any extreme changes in that 
particular year. 
Before proceeding to the analysis of the individual revenue and expense 
categories, a hypothesis test was constructed to determine if the revenues and expenses 
were statistically equivalent.  The following hypotheses were tested using a two-tailed     
t test and a 95% confidence interval:      
Ho: µ RGF  = µEGF 
H1: µRGF  ≠  µEGF 
Table 6 shows the results as they appeared in Microsoft Excel.  The null hypothesis will 
be rejected if the test statistic falls outside of the confidence interval. The 95% 
confidence interval is (-2.04,2.04); the test statistic is 0.83442.   The test statistic falls 
between the critical values of the confidence interval.  Therefore, we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis and assume the mean RGF and the mean EGF to be statistically equivalent.    
The impact of the previous statement supports evidence that the AFWCF is 
statistically meeting the break-even goal as far as revenues and expenses are concerned.  
However, when the prior-year AOR is included in the budget estimate submission 
problems arise and the activity groups move farther from the break-even goal.  Removing 
the requirement to recoup or reintroduce the prior-year AOR from the activity group’s 
responsibility may lead to a better-balanced Fund. 
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Table 6.  Two-Tailed t Test for Growth Factor Equivalence 
  RGF EGF 
Mean 1.050688 1.017125
Variance 0.01741 0.008475
Observations 16 16 
Pooled Variance 0.012943  
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 30  
t Stat 0.83442  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.41064  
t Critical two-tail 2.04227  
Std Dev 0.131948 0.092061
CV 0.125583 0.090511
 
Analysis of Individual Categories 
 A brief analysis of the trends associated with individual revenue and expense 
categories was conducted to locate areas necessitating more attention while building 
estimates.  Large variations were found among the activity groups so each group was 
evaluated separately.  In fact, some categories had estimates that were incorrect by as 
much as 2000% while others had only a 0.01% inaccuracy rate.  Yet in all fairness to the 
estimators, there is no crystal ball that allows them to see what will happen two years 
down the road.  They are limited by the information at hand and are unaware of future 
fluctuations.  By identifying areas of consistent inaccuracy, the intent is to provide insight 
to the AFWCF estimating personnel to aid in the elimination of the risk inherent in 
estimation. 
 Prior to exhibiting areas needing closer scrutiny, there are a few limitations 
needing identification.  First, revenue categories were reviewed from FY99 to FY02 
whereas expense categories were reviewed from FY00 to FY02.  The reason behind this 
difference is that in FY97, when the initial budget estimate was submitted for FY99, the 
expense categories were broken out differently than they were in subsequent years.  We 
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were unable to accurately match FY 99 expenses to the categories used today.  Second, 
only categories were considered that had activity all years in review.  And last, only 
categories that are consistently overestimated or consistently underestimated will be 
identified.  Those categories that have an overestimation one year and an underestimation 
the next were omitted from this investigation. The goal is to show recurrent trends that 
can be altered and adjusted for by the estimators.  The categories under consideration are 
listed in the previous BES sample in Figure 15. 
SMAG Estimations 
  After investigating the SMAG data, nine categories were found that were 
constantly overestimated or underestimated.  All trends were found in the expense 
portion of the data; none were found in the revenue categories.  Of those nine expense 
categories, only two showed constant underestimation.  Table 7 presents the SMAG 
findings. 
Table 7.  SMAG Estimation Trends for Consistently Underestimated and 
Overestimated Budget Categories for FY 00-FY02 
Expense Category Finding FY02 FY01 FY00 
Materials & Supplies (For Internal Purposes) Underestimated 81.41 39.22 53.49 
Transportation of Things Underestimated 121.91 32.65 131.06 
Civilian Personnel Compensation & Benefits Overestimated 2.78 11.63 7.20 
Travel & Transportation of Personnel Overestimated 40.97 29.58 23.37 
Printing & Reproduction Overestimated 33.14 12.68 28.33 
Advisory and Assistance Services Overestimated 100.00 100.00 31.85 
Rent, Communications, Utilities & Misc. Charges Overestimated 99.96 90.88 26.23 
Other Purchased Services Overestimated 99.65 98.99 32.70 
Other Expenses Overestimated 99.96 100.38 99.45 
 All values are percentages 
 
 Additional research should be conducted to identify which divisions of SMAG are 
the largest contributors to these trends.  This detailed information was not available 
during this research project.   
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DMAG Estimations 
 Thorough analysis of the DMAG data resulted in finding seven categories 
consistently under or over estimated.  Unlike SMAG, two categories fall under the 
revenue heading.  Table 8 lists DMAG findings. 
Table 8. DMAG Estimation Trends for Consistently Underestimated and 
Overestimated Budget Categories for FY 99-FY02 
Revenue Category Finding FY02 FY01 FY00 FY99 
Operations Underestimated 4.16 6.29 5.15 8.45 
Other Income Underestimated 127.73 266.24 44.60 221.70 
Expense Category      
Materials & Supplies (For 
Internal Purposes) Underestimated 25.24 5.16 13.91  
Civilian Personnel Compensation 
& Benefits Underestimated 6.53 6.25 6.13  
Rent, Communications, Utilities 
& Misc. Charges Underestimated 12.62 21.88 9.42  
Other Purchased Services Underestimated 9.80 17.16 25.14  
Other Expenses Overestimated 100.00 100.00 100.00  
 All values are percentages  
 
Unlike SMAG, many of the DMAG categories are underestimated.  The category 
entitled “Other Income” had the largest delta.  In all but fiscal year 2002, the activity 
group was not expecting any additional income in this category.  Yet, each year there was 
income ranging from $266.242 million to $547.000 million.  Further study to identify the 
source of this income would aid in determining if this factor can be estimated more 
accurately.  The same sort of situation applies to the “Other Expenses” category.  In this 
case, expenses were expected but never materialized. 
ISAG Estimations 
 Recall that ISAG is the smallest and newest activity group of the AFWCF so the 
impact it has on the Fund is minor compared to the rest of the activity groups, as 
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evidenced by the low correlation coefficient previously presented in Table 3.  Yet, any 
adverse impact on the Fund needs to be studied and corrected if possible.   
 Analysis of ISAG revenues and expenses identified only four categories with 
consistencies; one of which falls under revenue.  And with the exception of one category, 
all are underestimations.  ISAG estimation trends can be found in Table 9.  Note that the 
problem area is the estimation of equipment expenses but there is decreasing trend in the 
inaccuracy of this element. 
Table 9.  ISAG Estimation Trends for Consistently Underestimated and 
Overestimated Budget Categories for FY 99-FY02 
Revenue Category Finding FY02 FY01 FY00 FY99 
Operations Underestimated 4.73 2.99 8.31 48.98 
Expense Category      
Materials & Supplies (For 
Internal Purposes) Overestimated 33.82 34.31 120.73  
Civilian Personnel Compensation 
& Benefits Underestimated 17.95 2.26 3.11  
Equipment Underestimated 87.56 524.36 2023.82  
 All values are percentages  
 
TWCF Estimations 
 Last, a look at TWCF trends completes this portion of the BES analysis.  Six 
expense categories were identified as having consistent estimation patterns, all located in 
the expense category.  They are shown in Table 10.  Notice that the steadiest pattern is in 
the “Equipment” category.  Based on the present data, this is a prime example of where a 
cost growth factor could be built into the estimate to eliminate the continual 
overestimation in years to come.  
Estimation Summary  
 Reviewing the findings presented above, it is evident that two expense categories 
have been continuous problems for the estimators: Civilian Personnel Compensation & 
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Benefits and Material Purchases (For Internal Purposes).   Each of the four activity 
groups had difficulties accurately predicting these elements for the three years under 
review.   Table 11 illustrates the commonality among the activity groups. 
Table 10.  TWCF Estimation Trends for Consistently Underestimated and 
Overestimated Budget Categories for FY 00-FY02 
Expense Category Finding FY02 FY01 FY00 
Civilian Personnel Compensation & Benefits Overestimated 63.67 3.52 0.08 
Equipment Overestimated 59.80 58.01 48.24 
Materials & Supplies (For Internal Purposes) Overestimated 8.05 14.64 10.12 
Other Purchases from Revolving Funds Overestimated 41.00 11.60 13.30 
Rent, Communications, Utilities & Misc. Charges Overestimated 56.39 31.05 9.61 
Transportation of Things Overestimated 40.91 13.13 0.64 
Travel & Transportation of Personnel Underestimated 127.82 0.36 0.72 
 All values are percentages 
 
Table 11. Common Expense Categories Consistently Underestimated or 
Overestimated by AFWCF Activity Groups 
Category Activity Group Finding 
Average % 
Deviation 
Civilian SMAG Overestimated 7.2 
Personnel DMAG Underestimated 6.3 
Compensation & ISAG Underestimated 7.77 
Benefits TWCF Overestimated 22.42 
Materials & SMAG Underestimated 58.04 
Supplies DMAG Underestimated 14.77 
(For Internal ISAG Overestimated 62.95 
Purposes) TWCF Overestimated 10.94 
 
These findings should be addressed to AFWCF senior leadership and more 
information should be gathered from the respective activity groups to determine if this is 
simply coincidence or if this is a problem that can be avoided with better identification of 
the risks associated with over or under estimating these categories.  Again, with such a 
trend, a growth factor could be developed that can be incorporated into the estimation 
process that will effectively account for this discrepancy.   
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Lack of Inflation 
One problem identified when reviewing information in the BES’ obtained for this 
study was the omission of inflation when incorporating the AOR from a prior-year.  The 
problem lies in the fact that when the prior-year AOR is added to the budget estimate, it 
is not reduced to account for inflation.  This is the case throughout all of the activity 
groups in all of the BES reviewed.  Because this was so common, the base year for each 
BES was verified to determine that this was in fact an omission.  Personnel from HQ 
AFMC/LG verified what appeared to be true-- values in the FY01 column are in FY01 
dollars, values in the FY02 column are in FY02 dollars and values in the FY03 column 
are in FY03 dollars.  A sample transcribed from the Fund 14 report for DMAG in the 
FY03 BES is shown in Table 12 for explanation purposes.   
Table 12.  Actual Uninflated AOR Data from DMAG Portion of FY03 BES 
 2001 2002 2003 
($ in Millions) Actual Approved Requested 
Prior-Year AOR (175.904) (253.151) (43.283)
Accumulated Operating Result (253.151) (43.283) (43.283)
 
One would expect the prior-year AOR in FY02 that is being recouped from FY01 to be 
larger due to inflation and the same for FY03.   The problem is that when the inflation 
factor is not accounted for, the prior-year AOR is underestimated.  Using raw OSD 
inflation indices for O&M monies, with a base year of FY01 the values in Table 12 were 
inflated for FY02 and FY03 at 1.017 and 1.030 respectively to reflect the true amounts 
needing to be incorporated in the BES.  These are shown in Table 13 below.  Notice that 
there is now a large difference in the Prior-Year AORs being recouped.  Approximately 
$4.3 million more needs to be recouped in FY02 and $1.3 million more in FY03.  Keep in 
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mind that this is just the DMAG portion of the AFWCF, the other activity groups will 
need to be inflated as well which will produce an even greater effect.  By correcting this 
easily remedied error, the Fund’s estimates will be more accurate which will aid in 
approaching the break-even point. 
Table 13.  Proposed Inflation of AOR Data from DMAG Portion of FY03 BES 
 2001 2002 2003 
($ in Millions) Actual Approved Requested 
Prior-Year AOR (175.904) (257.455) (44.581)
Accumulated Operating Result (253.151) (43.283) (43.283)
 
MSD Review 
 Remember that the MSD is responsible for providing parts, frequently referred to 
as Depot Level Reparables (DLRs), to its customers for use in weapons systems.  Most 
often MSD obtains these DLRs from the Depot Maintenance Activity Group (DMAG), 
but also purchases them from commercial vendors.  The MSD is an integral part of the 
warfighter’s capability.  Without the necessary spares for repair, the mission may not be 
accomplished.  This importance is also demonstrated in the fact that this is the largest 
division of the SMAG and in FY02 was projected to generate $9 billion of the activity 
group’s $20 billion in expected revenue.  The focus on MSD is therefore necessary to 
understand why the SMAG is the key driver in the AFWCF’s performance as mentioned 
earlier in this chapter.   
MSD Pricing Strategy 
The Materiel Support Division’s (MSD) pricing strategy has undergone recent 
changes that are expected to positively affect its customers.  Before describing the new 
strategy, it is important to understand what type of pricing process it is moving from.  
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After the strategy is explained, we will determine if it follows commercial best practices 
as outlined by Olsen and Peter.   
 Up until fiscal year 2003, the MSD pricing strategy revolved around recouping 
the prior year losses it had generated so a surcharge was added to all DLR orders.  And 
like most of the other activity groups, it wasn’t able to accurately price its products so 
customers were continually canceling orders because prices were raised higher than their 
budgets would allow.  It was a form of cost-plus pricing.  Ordinarily, cost-plus pricing 
encompasses all direct and indirect costs associated with a product and adds an additional 
percentage for profit.  The MSD tries to capture all direct costs but has done a poor job of 
capturing the true indirect costs of a product.  As such, you will see that MSD charges a 
surcharge that is essentially summarizing its best guess at indirect costs.  However, there 
is an added portion that is necessary to recoup prior year losses.  This is in essence the 
same as trying to make a profit.  This is the best description of MSD’s pricing method in 
the early days.  The pricing approach up until FY03 had been in place for several years.  
A multi-part pricing scheme is slated to begin in FY05, which alleviates much of the 
burden to recoup the NOR from the customers, and shifts it to HQ AFMC. 
Like all other AFWCF divisions, MSD begins the pricing process two years prior 
to the year of execution.  So, in FY99, the FY01 budget estimate along with the price 
build commenced.  The first step was to obtain customer requirements.  These 
requirements are estimated by the customer and are output in the form of the D200 
Report.  This automated report utilizes computer algorithms to evaluate prior year 
requirements and projected requirements to arrive at the future requirements that are 
ultimately used to build the prices.  The algorithms within this program have not been 
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studied but warrant a closer look to determine the accuracy of their output.  Accurate 
requirements are vital to the accuracy of the rates emerging from the budget process 
since, in its simplest form, the rate is a function of the costs and requirements.   
While estimated requirements are being built, MSD personnel are gathering data 
to determine what revenues and expenses the division expects to encounter.  The 
revenues and expenses are what you will find in the BES.  However, this portion of the 
research is concerned with the price development procedure.  Prior to FY03, there were 
three areas to consider during the rate (price) build. The first component of the price is 
the weighted average repair cost which is also known as the Latest Repair Cost (LRC).  
This is the cost to repair a DLR.  It is comprised of both organic repairs and repairs made 
by contractors.  These factors are then weighted to obtain the total LRC.  This amount is 
then divided by the estimated requirements from the D200 to obtain the cost to repair 
each DLR.  Note that this price will fluctuate based on the type of DLR being priced.   
The next component of the price charged the customers is called the Total Buy 
Surcharge Base on Projected Orders.  This element is a surcharge added to the LRC and 
is determined by the requirements system.  It is based on total orders so it includes orders 
for condemnations as well as orders for routine repairs, making no distinction on when 
the order will be delivered.  Often times, an order will be submitted for a condemnation 
but the part will not be delivered to the customer for a few years later.  This was the most 
volatile portion of the price because the surcharge was often very different for customers.  
It is based on the expected buys, as outlined in the requirements, for individual DLR 
items.  There were large fluctuations in the surcharge being charged different customers.  
While one customer may have a small surcharge, another may encounter one that is 
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enormous.  This was due to the fact that the surcharge was based on a market basket of 
goods; this does not encompass all items in the inventory.  So parts were simply put into 
a category that best fit its description and that surcharge prevailed.  Many customers felt 
there was no real rhyme or reason on how this surcharge was set.  It just didn’t add up.  
And as you will see later, this is the portion of the price process that sees the most change 
in future years.   
The last element in the price is a surcharge that’s added to all DLRs to cover 
business operation expenses, also known as overhead.   This portion of the price was 
more predictable than the latter but it still fluctuated because the Supply Chain Managers 
(SCM) were able to set the surcharge based on the parts they control at their location.  As 
one can probably ascertain, this type of pricing strategy did not lend itself to helping the 
AFWCF achieve its break-even goal.  Let’s see how the process changes in the coming 
years.   
The FY03-04 pricing strategy is similar to the previous process with the exception 
of the surcharges.  Now, instead of having two surcharges based on the commodity or 
SCM, there is one flat surcharge that encompasses both of these elements which is 
computed at the HQAFMC level.  Another change is that rather than the surcharge taking 
into account parts for repairs and condemnations, it will only be based on projected 
delivery of parts.  Customers will no longer be paying for condemnation items they have 
not yet taken delivery of.  This increases rate stability for customers as well as decreases 
losses for the Fund.  But, according to HQAFMC personnel this is expected to meet only 
90% of the DLR pricing objectives.  The other 10% is an expected loss in this fiscal year.  
This is clearly not promoting a break-even mentality.  Yet, this situation is only 
 
62  
temporary.  In FY05, another change is projected to occur and should remedy this 
problem. 
The final projected change to the MSD pricing strategy will occur in FY05. Again 
this method is similar to the previous years’ process, with the exception of further 
changing the surcharge portion of the price.   This final change is definitely a step in the 
right direction.  Beginning this fiscal year, Air Force customers will only be charged the 
LRC when a sale is made.  The remaining overhead expenses will be billed directly to a 
corporate Air Force account that will not affect the operation of the division.  All non-Air 
Force customers will be required to pay the surcharge.  The initial set-up of this corporate 
account will be the result of funds being realigned from the Air Force and the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense.  In subsequent years, it will be the sole responsibility of 
HQAFMC to fund this account.  The bad news is that HQAFMC needs to realign funds 
to do this.  The goods news is that customers will see costs that are more comparable to 
items they can purchase on the outside so they will be less apt to cancel orders.  This 
results in more stabilized revenue for the SMAG and ultimately the AFWCF, which will 
aid the Fund in reaching its primary goal. 
MSD vs. Commercial Pricing Practices 
  Looking back in the Literature Review you will find a six-step pricing strategy 
proposed by Olsen and Peter.  Their approach, though focused on the private sector, was 
especially of interest to this study due to its foundation of consumer analysis. An in depth 
look at their process was also included in chapter 2.  What follows is a comparison of the 
MSD pricing strategy to Olsen and Peter’s strategy to determine if MSD is operating 
inline with commercial best practices.  The six steps are as follows: 
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 1.  Analyze consumer product relationship 
2.  Analyze the environmental situation 
3.  Determine the role of price in marketing strategy 
4.  Estimate relevant production and marketing costs 
5.  Set pricing objectives 
6.  Develop pricing strategy and set prices  
Step 1 – Analyze Consumer Product Relationship 
 This step is essential for MSD since it relies on its customer’s projections of 
requirements to set its prices.  This research found that MSD does a fair job of obtaining 
the information needed.  However, one disturbing fact discovered early on was that MSD 
was not tracking the accuracy of the requirements submitted by the customer.  Yet, as of 
December 2002, MSD was working on remedying this oversight.  If you refer back to 
Table 1 you can see the impact to the customer if they over-estimate their requirements.  
On the other hand, it has a serious affect on the fund because it will not sell as many parts 
due to the over-inflated requirements, which drives a loss in the Fund because expenses 
do not change in proportion to revenue.  MSD is aware of the implication of accurate 
requirements estimates and is taking appropriate action to track their exactness.  
Step 2 – Analyze Environmental Situation 
 The environment MSD operates within is notably unique and typically more 
constrained than what is found in the commercial sector.  Revisiting information stated in 
chapter 2, the main purpose of performing this phase in strategic pricing is to obtain 
information about competitors in the market and determine the value the customer places 
on the product.  MSD, like any other military organization, operates within a distinctive 
environment focused ultimately on national defense.  As such, MSD must focus on 
meeting the needs of the warfighter above all else.  An examination of each of these 
factors and their pertinence to MSD was completed. 
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The unique operating environment of MSD encompasses a wide array of 
situations.  First and foremost is the realization that MSD functions like a monopoly due 
to the unique nature of the parts it supplies to customers.  MSD manages over 132,000 
inventory items for aircraft, missiles, engines and DLRs that in most cases cannot be 
obtained from the private sector due to contractual agreements or one-of-a kind 
requirements.  There is no outside source for these parts so it can be said that MSD has an 
internal market.  Equally, MSD must analyze its internal market to assess its readiness to 
respond to not only current requirements but also future requirements brought about by 
contingency operations or future threats the military will respond to.   
Another difference in the MSD environment when compared to the commercial 
sector is the imposition of strict constraints.  All large businesses encounter some degree 
of adversity when altering their business operations but in most cases, an act of Congress 
is not required to change these instructions.  The strict oversight by Congress of the DoD, 
the stringent regulatory requirements MSD must follow and looming budgetary 
limitations are all constraining factors that must be addressed and dealt with accordingly.  
Unlike a commercial firm, MSD can carry a negative operating result for an extended 
period of time without the formidable fact that it will either go out of business or go 
bankrupt because other divisions in the AFWCF can counter the negative effect on the 
Fund.     
 When considering value from the customer’s point-of-view, many factors are 
present in the commercial environment including not only the monetary value of the 
product but the importance or value customers place on intangible costs and benefits.  
Unfortunately, the perceived value of the warfighter is often a moot point.  They must 
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purchase items whether they value them or not to continue to support the mission.  And 
again, due to the limited source of many products MSD carries, customers are forced to 
make purchases regardless of how they perceive the product’s value to their program. 
To summarize, MSD’s environmental situation is influenced by many 
constraining elements and has few, if any, competitors.  The main constraints are those 
imposed by the Congress and DoD regulations along with the limited budgets its 
customers are working with.  The perceived value of MSD’s customers is not a 
consideration due to the uniqueness of the parts it supplies.  However, it may warrant 
further research in other areas of the AFWCF.  For instance, the GSD supplies many 
items that can be purchased in the private sector.  And often the prices in the private 
sector are considerably lower than what the GSD division is charging due to the over 
inflation of price caused by the surcharges.  Though this step of the price setting process 
is entirely appropriate for the commercial sector, it is only partially so for the MSD.  
Step 3 – Determine the Role of Price in Marketing Strategy 
 To begin with, the marketing strategy of MSD is not to make a profit or gain hold 
of a new market segment as in a commercial firm.  When considering marketing strategy 
in the MSD, the focus remains on accurately pricing products so customers will purchase 
as close to the number stated in their initial estimates as possible.  Remember that the 
customer plays a large role in the price of the product due to the formula used to compute 
the price.  The LRC for an item is divided by the total requirements submitted by all 
customers for that item resulting in the price charged each customer for that item.  
Surcharges are then added to cover other operating expenses.  Understanding this 
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relationship is the key to understanding the role of price in the marketing strategy of 
MSD.   
Another element of understanding price in the marketing strategy is the 
realization that there is little, if any external market for MSD to conquer.  Instead, MSD 
operates in an internal market, supplying primarily Air Force customers with its products.  
One noted exception is the foreign military sales of products to other allied governments.  
Yet the percentage of these sales in relation to the sales to the Air Force and other DoD 
services is minute.   The role of pricing in MSD is highly related to the performance of 
the SMAG.  And based on the high correlation between the AFWCF and SMAG, MSD is 
strongly related to how the AFWCF performs as well.  Yet, the importance of price to 
MSD customers cannot be understated.  This is the single most important step MSD must 
focus on, not only for the benefit of this division, but also for the benefit of the AFWCF 
and ultimately the DWCF.   Inaccurate pricing can push the performance of the AFWCF 
away from attaining its break-even goal. In fact, the role of price in the MSD 
performance is simply charging customers inter-fund transfer prices.  Due to the large 
internal market and the absence of an external market, MSD sells a large portion of its 
products to Air Force customers.  Understanding how internal customers are affected by 
changes is vital to the division’s success. 
The role of price in the MSD is simple, if prices are too high, customers cannot 
buy as many products as they had estimated.  Without this revenue, the division will 
suffer a loss due to the expenses not dropping in proportion to the decreased income.  The 
accurate estimation of requirements is a vital part of the revolving fund process and must 
be watched carefully to ensure the division’s successful financial operation. 
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Step 4 – Estimate Relevant Production and Marketing Costs 
 Requirements estimation is vital to this phase as well.  Estimating the relevant 
production and marketing costs is difficult for the MSD to do accurately due to the length 
of the budget process.  The MSD has the most trouble enacting this phase of Olsen and 
Peter’s process.  This phase is very important to the success of the Division but this is 
also where the budgetary process imposed by the DoD is questioned.   Not only is MSD 
required to accept the requirements from their customers two years in advance of the 
budget execution, they must also determine what costs will be two years in advance.  
Ideally, a firm should be able to accurately estimate its costs prior to setting its prices yet 
the commercial sector does not impose this lengthy budget process.    
 This phase of the process is also where it is identified how prices should be set.  
In the commercial world, this enables the identification of the minimum price needed to 
enter the market.  For MSD, this is comparable to determining what the prices will have 
to be to meet its goal of breaking-even.  Although the MSD meet the requirements of this 
step, it is again hindered by the regulatory constraints imposed upon it.   
Step 5 – Set Pricing Objectives 
 Setting the pricing objectives a firm wants to achieve can be a daunting task.  For 
many, this can include identification of the company’s goal and objectives.  The 
objectives are set here to meet those goals.  The private firms will generally aim to make 
a minimum return on investment or minimum profit it will accept.  Unfortunately, MSD 
does not have the luxury of setting its own objectives.  Instead, it must seek to achieve 
the goals of its parent organization, the DWCF.  So, rather than striving to meet a certain 
 
68  
return on investment, its main objective is to set its prices so it can come as close to 
breaking even as possible.    
Step 6 – Develop Pricing Strategy and Set Prices 
 The final step in Olsen and Peter’s (1996) process is the culmination of the work 
performed under the five previous steps.  All aspects of the organization and its goals 
come together here.  The commercial side will mainly focus on setting prices that are far 
enough about its costs to produce the revenue required to sustain its operations and meets 
its goals.  Furthermore, it strives to set its prices strategically so the required level of 
demand is maintained.   
 MSD follows this step similarly to a private firm.  It too wants to set its prices to 
generate a predetermined amount of revenue.  And, MSD focuses on the customer 
demand by accepting requirements from its customers because if it doesn’t, it will not 
meet its pricing objectives outlined in step 5.  The only drawback for MSD is yet again, 
the lengthy budget process that is drawn out beyond anything the commercial sector 
could easily accommodate. 
 All in all, MSD is aligned with the commercial best practices outlined here with a 
few notable exceptions.  First, MSD works in a unique environment with little outside 
competition.  This limits the need for MSD to seek information about competitors.  
Instead, the relationship with its customers necessitates the most attention.  Second, the 
lengthy budgetary process limits MSD’s ability to adapt to changing requirements in a 
timely manner.  Finally, regulatory guidance imposes strict rules on changes that can be 
made during the budget process. This limits the flexibility MSD had to adapt to changing 
environments, changing requirements and changing costs it encounters.   
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V.  Conclusion 
Results 
This study visited several aspects of the AFWCF’s operation and performance thus 
enabling the study’s research objectives to be answered.  Referring back to the three 
research questions we sought to answer, it is apparent that answers to some are more 
complex than others and have a greater impact on the Fund.  Recall that the three 
research objectives outlined in Chapter I are: 
1. Are the goals of the DWCF reflected in the AFWCF Activity Group’s 
pricing strategies? 
2. How do the different Activity Groups under the AFWCF differ in their 
pricing strategies?  Is any Activity Group’s pricing strategy allowing them 
to break-even? 
3. How can the current pricing strategies be improved upon to come nearer to 
meeting the DWCF’s goals?  Where should the Air Force focus its efforts to 
improve the MSD pricing strategy? 
The remainder of this paper will present answers to these questions, identify 
limitations in the research process, make recommendations based upon the research 
findings, and suggest additional areas of the AFWCF and related topics that warrant 
future research. 
AFWCF Goals 
 The answer to the first research question was identified throughout the literature 
review phase of this study.  It was determined that the goals of the DWCF are reflected in 
the pricing strategies of the AFWCF.  First, the AFWCF is a subsidiary division of the 
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DWCF.  As such, it inherits the DWCF’s goals and objectives.  Additionally, the pricing 
strategies for all of the DWCF divisions are outlined in the DODFMR 7000.14R and 
must be followed with few exceptions.   If a division is commodity based, it must price 
its products based upon the cost of the commodity and add an additional surcharge to 
cover the cost of operations.  Non-supply based divisions price their services based upon 
their output measures whether it be direct labor hour, direct per standard hour or some 
other output measure.  Due to this regulatory requirement, there is little room for 
fluctuation.  Though the AFWCF can have additional goals and objectives of its own, it 
must follow and align itself with those of its parent organization.  All things considered, 
the AFWCF is inline with the DWCF’s goals.   
Pricing Strategies & Performance 
 Closely related to the first research question, the first part of question number two 
seeks to determine if the AFWCF activity groups have different pricing strategies.  The 
answer to this question was again found throughout the literature review.  As mentioned 
above, the divisions have different pricing strategies based upon the type of goods or 
services they provide as outlined in the DoDFMR 7000.14R. 
 To answer the second portion of this question, whether or not any of the activity 
group’s pricing strategies allowing them to break-even, it was necessary to analyze past 
performance data.  Remember that the general consensus is that the AFWCF is operating 
poorly due to its inability to meet is primary objective of breaking-even over time.  First, 
the performance of the AFWCF based on the NOR and AOR, was plotted for fiscal years 
1997 to 2001.  This showed wide fluctuations in the both the AOR and NOR from year-
to-year.  However, since the AOR is the cumulative NOR since the Fund’s inception, I 
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chose to focus on the performance at the NOR level as an indicator of the Fund’s 
performance.  The plot showed that although there are large fluctuations, the variance in 
the annual NOR is decreasing as the Fund matures.   This is evidence that the Fund is 
becoming increasingly closer to meeting its goal of breaking-even which suggests that 
AFWCF personnel are building better estimates.   
Next, the performance of each of the activity group’s, based upon the NOR, was 
compared to the NOR of the AFWCF to determine if any of the activity groups were key 
drivers in the AFWCF’s performance.  Initially, the graphs illustrated a possible 
relationship between the AFWCF and SMAG, as well as the AFWCF and TWCF due to 
the closely related trends among the NORs.   Further analysis would need to be 
conducted to determine if these are significant relationships.   An additional relationship 
between the AFWCF and ISAG was identified.  This relationship illustrated that although 
the ISAG is the smallest portion of the AFWCF, it appears to be having an opposite 
effect on the Fund.  It is minutely counteracting the effects of the other activity groups, 
thus bringing the Fund closer to its break-even point. 
Further analysis was conducted using bi-variate correlation.  This identified that 
the AFWCF/SMAG relationship was the only relationship having statistical significance.  
Thus, SMAG is the key driver of the Fund’s performance.  This is intuitive due to the fact 
that SMAG is the largest activity group of the AFWCF.  Nevertheless, it was important to 
support this notion with statistical evidence.   By identifying which activity group is 
playing the largest role in the Fund’s success or failure allows AFWCF personnel to more 
closely scrutinize the actions of the division in an attempt to improve the Fund’s 
performance. 
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The final portion of the performance analysis required the use of Fund 14 data in 
Budget Estimate Submissions from fiscal years 1997 to 2004.  Here, revenue and expense 
categories were examined.  The goal was to determine if the initial submissions in the 
BES were equivalent to the actual income and expenditures for fiscal years 1999 to 2002.  
Revenue and Expense growth factors were computed for each of the activity groups.  
These factors demonstrated how accurate the initial estimates were when compared with 
the actuals.  The results suggest that TWCF has been submitting the most accurate BES.  
However, it was also determined that DMAG and ISAG were consistently 
underestimating revenue while SMAG and TWCF consistently overestimated expenses in 
the BES’.  These trends of over and under estimation deserve further study but were not 
addressed in this research effort.   
Further analysis was conducted to determine if overall revenues are equal to the 
expenses.  A hypothesis test was conducted to determine if the mean of the revenue 
growth factors was equal to the mean of the expense growth factors.  A two-tailed t test 
as conducted to test for the equal means.  This test resulted in a failure to reject the null 
hypothesis, thus, we assume that the means are equal.  The impact of this previous 
statement supports evidence that the AFWCF is statistically meeting its break-even goal.  
In other words, the estimates of revenues and expenses are accurate.  However, it is 
important to remember that this does not take into account the AOR that is recouped from 
previous years.  Yet, it does suggest that the problem does not lie in the estimation of 
income and expenditures.  Rather, it suggests that removing the requirement to recoup or 
reintroduce the prior year’s AOR from the activity group’s responsibility may lead to a 
better balanced Fund.   
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 Finally, the scope was narrowed yet again to look at the individual revenue and 
expense categories for signs of consistent over or under estimation.   Each of the activity 
group’s had several areas that were consistent problems.  However, there were two 
categories in particular that were common among all activity groups: Civilian Personnel 
Compensation & Benefits and Materials & Supplies (For Internal Purposes).  Civilian 
Personnel Compensation & Benefits was consistently overestimated by SMAG and 
TWCF and underestimated by DMAG and ISAG.  The Material & Supplies category was 
consistently underestimated by SMAG and DMAG, while it was always overestimated by 
ISAG and TWCF.  More information should be gathered from the respective activity 
groups to determine if this is simply coincidence or if this is a problem that can be 
avoided with better identification of the risks associated with over and under estimating 
these categories.  If this is truly a problem area for the activity groups, a growth factor 
could be developed that can be incorporated into the estimation process that will 
effectively account for this common discrepancy.   
 Aside from the information presented above, one last item of interest was 
identified when reviewing the figures presented in the BES.  It appears that inflation was 
not taken into account when the prior-year AOR was rolled back into the Fund.  The 
impact this has on the Fund is a negative one.  By not incorporating inflation into the 
estimates, the Fund is not striving to recoup the full amount of the AOR.  When the 
DMAG portion of the FY 2003 BES was observed and then properly inflated, it resulted 
in $4.3 million more that needed to be recouped in FY02 and $1.3 million more in FY03.  
Keep in mind that this is solely the DMAG portion of the AFWCF, the other activity 
groups will need to be inflated as well, which will produce an even greater effect.  By 
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correcting this easily remedied error, the Fund’s estimates will be more accurate which 
will aid in approaching the break-even point. 
The analysis of the performance suggests that the AFWCF is not operating as 
poorly as is often thought.  In fact, most signs point to an improving Fund.  First, the 
NOR is decreasing over time. Next, SMAG is the key driver of the Fund’s performance 
and should be treated as such, but it too has a decreasing NOR trend.  And finally, the 
estimated revenues are equivalent to the estimated expenses.   The identification of 
expense categories that are consistent problems among the activity groups will allow 
AFWCF personnel to focus their efforts on these areas in particular, which will aid in 
meeting the goals primary objective.  Although the Fund is not breaking-even, this 
analysis suggests that the AFWCF is as close to operating as intended as it will ever be, 
as long as the AOR is still a factor. 
MSD Pricing Strategy 
The final research question was addressed by comparing the pricing strategy of 
the Materiel Support Division against commercial best practices as outlined by Olsen and 
Peter (1996).  An analysis of their six-step pricing scheme implies that MSD is inline 
with commercial best practices with a few minor exceptions.  First, MSD operates within 
the internal DOD market, which insists on a close working relationship with the 
customer.  Remember, customers tell MSD what the demand will be from year-to-year.    
Second, due to the unique parts MSD provides its customers, competition is not a factor.  
Third, price has a greater impact on MSD’s customers than customers in the commercial 
sector. MSD’s customers have budget constraints imposed by the Congress that rarely 
increase but often decrease.  Any change in the price MSD charges will most certainly 
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have a negative impact on the customer as well as the Fund.  Finally, regulatory 
requirements imposed on MSD prevent any flexibility in its pricing schema.   
Limitations 
 There were a number of limiting factors throughout this research.  Firstly, the 
time it takes to fully understand the AFWCF concept is monumental. This is an enormous 
process with many aspects.  The research focused on the accrual accounting side of the 
AFWCF since it is the most widely published and analyzed.  However, a look at the 
AFWCF’s performance from the cash accounting aspect may yield different results.   
Second, gathering information to study this topic was both time consuming and difficult.  
Information is available in several different accounting and logistical systems but most 
background information was gathered from people and other AFWCF reports and 
articles.  Yet, the form used by each is different so apples to apples comparison could not 
be made.   Ultimately, the BES were the best source of data that could be obtained in a 
timely fashion.  However, the assumption that the information is correct was made.  This 
assumption was discovered to be false when looking at data for FY99.  There were 
several instances where itemized category totals did not match the category total.  We 
were unable to identify whether this was a simple addition error or if information was 
missing so this data was omitted from the study. 
 Finally, much of the data prior to fiscal year 1999 was incomplete or reported in 
different revenue and expense categories.  Again, data prior to FY1999 was omitted from 
this study.  
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Recommendations 
There are three recommendations that have stemmed from this research.  The first 
recommendation is to revisit the break-even goal that looms over the AFWCF.  Not only 
is this statistically impossible, it is unrealistic when looking at a $20 billion program.  
Instead, a more realistic goal should be implemented that is both achievable and realistic.  
A more suitable goal would be to set a target AOR ceiling or floor.  However, since the 
Fund receives the most attention when it carries a negative AOR, a ceiling would be most 
appropriate.  The value of this ceiling should be a percentage of the each division’s 
revenue.  If the division is expected to generate $9 billion in revenue, an AOR of $100 
million is a mere 1.1% loss, just a drop in the bucket from this perspective.  In fact, a cost 
growth of only 1% would be welcomed in any program.  The value the ceiling is set at is 
cause for additional study to determine the most realistic and achievable value.   
As a result of the research conducted here, cost growth factors should be built and 
incorporated into the BES process for at least the two expense categories that proved to 
be consistent problems for all activity groups.  However, additional factors should be 
built for each of the unique categories consistently over or underestimated by AFWCF 
personnel in the activity groups.  The inclusion of growth factors in the forecasting 
process will provide a better estimation of revenues and expenses, thereby aiding the 
Fund in more closely achieving its goal.   
The final recommendation concerns the lack of inflation identified in the BES.  
The lack of inflation when reincorporating the prior-year AOR drives a loss in the Fund.  
These amounts must be inflated to their respective year to accurately estimate the Fund’s 
future performance.  This is easily remedied and will not require additional work.  The 
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inflation rates are already published when the BES is submitted.  The time and effort 
required to accurately inflate the prior-year AOR is negligible.  Although the impact this 
will have on the overall Fund may be minute, any estimate that is more accurate is 
appreciated. 
Future Research 
The final area of this study includes several recommendations for future research 
projects ranging from requirements estimation to other DWCF organizations.  What 
follows is a brief description of each of the recommended research areas. 
D200 Study.   As presented earlier in this paper, requirements are a key player in 
the accuracy of AFWCF estimates.  Thus, it is appropriate to recommend that a study be 
conducted to review the accuracy of past requirements as submitted by the customer.  
Additionally, the relevance and accuracy of the algorithms used in the D200 report 
generation also warrant study.     
Forecasting.  Another area recommended for study is the forecasting techniques 
utilized in the BES build process.  Analysis of the current techniques may identify areas 
needing improvement.  We already know that the forecasts should contain a growth 
factor for commonly misestimated elements to increase their accuracy.  However, there 
are other elements of estimations that can be reviewed and adjusted to ensure more 
accurate forecasts.  
Other DWCF Divisions.   Other divisions of the DWCF should be studied to 
determine if they are having similar problems to those of the AFWCF.  The insight this 
study can provide would be invaluable to the AFWCF.  Information sharing is necessary 
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and expected since each of the other DWCF divisions are confined by the same 
regulatory and budgetary constraints.   
Other AFWCF Activity Groups.  Next, we recommend that other areas of the 
AFWCF be studied to ascertain where their processes can be improved upon.  It has 
already been determined in Cintron’s (2002) thesis and this research effort that flexibility 
in pricing and estimating is lost due to long lead times necessary in the PPBS cycle, as 
well as constraints imposed by regulations.  Additionally, it would be interesting to 
determine if customers have as large an impact on service organizations as they do in the 
MSD of SMAG.  
DMAG / MSD Relationship.  The relationship between DMAG and MSD is 
recursive in nature.  According to information obtained throughout this research effort, 
DMAG cannot set its rates for depot level maintenance until it knows the prices that 
MSD will charge it for parts.  However, MSD cannot set their prices until they know 
what rate DMAG will be charging to repair the parts it sends to the depots.  As one might 
suspect, there is an ongoing battle to accurately set these rates in a timely fashion.  
However, the recursive nature requires DMAG to set its rates, pass them to MSD, MSD 
will review and adjust their rates, and then send them back to the DMAG, and so on.  
This continues until both have agreed on their rates.  This is a circle that must be broken.  
It is recommended that this relationship be studied to determine if there is a better way of 
doing business between the two divisions.  The new DMAG/MSD reconciliation is a step 
in the right direction.  Future research can determine if this will work long term and can 
perhaps identify if it is more appropriate for MSD to fall under DMAG’s control. 
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